Book of Abstracts
- September the 4th -
afternoon
Opening Lecture

Plenary Speaker:
Carlotta Pavese
Reasoning and Presuppositions

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AULA CS3

Symposium on Motivated Irrationality

Invited speaker: Alfred Mele: Weakness of will

Emanuela Ceva and Lubomira Radoilska
Responsibility for Reason-Giving: Learning from Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption

When individuals fail to recognize their involvement in a corrupt practice, how and why may that ignorance affect their reason-giving? We identify and explore this particular instance of inadvertent actions and articulate, on this basis, a new approach to culpable ignorance and responsibility, beyond the current standoff between attributivists and accountabilists. We make two main claims. First, systemic corruption prompts a distinctive kind of tainted reasoning, at the interface of epistemic vice and epistemic disadvantage. Individual doublethink aligned with institutional doublespeak is an example. We argue that this alignment conceals a particular crisis of intelligibility. Notably, the surreptitious nature of systemic corruption subverts intelligibility by an excess of ready-made rationalisations for individual action. Second, responsibility for tainted reasoning is best understood as sui generis rather than a lesser degree of overall moral responsibility. This helps examine reason-giving for inadvertent right- as well as wrongdoings. Our account of the specific kind of rationalisation that occurs in cases of individual inadvertent involvement in systemically corrupt practices thus engages with two related debates. The first concerns the nature and significance of rationalisation. We single out the kind of rationalisation corruption instantiates by contrast with other apparently germane cases. These are cases where agents rationalise actions performed for no reason and cases of motivated irrationality such as self-deception, where reasons for action that clash with one’s self-image are tacitly substituted with others, more attuned to it. The second debate concerns how different kinds of ignorance might affect individual responsibility in ethical, legal, and political contexts. We look at the case of systemic corruption within the broader context of cases where deep-seated, unsuspecting ignorance amplifies culpability. We also consider positive cases, such as ignoring available evidence or suspending belief out of well-understood professional duty.

Anna Ichino
Superstitious Imaginings
I investigate a variety of motivated irrationality which is very pervasive in our cognitive lives, yet relatively underexplored in recent philosophical discussions. This is what psychologists call ‘superstitious (or magical) thinking’, broadly construed so as to include not only traditional superstitions like those concerning broken mirrors or black cats, but also a number of more idiosyncratic superstitious constructs concerning such things as lucky charms, propitiatory rituals, telepathic connections, hidden global conspiracies, etc.

This superstitious thinking – characterised by a tendency to exaggerate the world’s meaningfulness, coherence, and intelligent design – is typically described in doxastic terms: we commonly ascribe to each other superstitious ‘beliefs’, ‘beliefs’ in magic, ‘beliefs’ in conspiracy theories. But recent psychological research provides grounds to challenge these ascriptions, showing that superstitious thoughts lack such key features of belief as evidence-sensitivity and holistic inferential integration, and are therefore best understood in non-doxastic terms.

In particular, the influential ‘dual-system account of magical thinking’ defended by Risen (2016) – on which superstitions are formed via the motivationally biased heuristics of System 1, and subsequently maintained by the ‘deliberate acquiescence’ of System 2— reveals striking functional similarities between superstitious and imaginative cognition.

On these bases, and having discounted alternative explanations in terms of novel states like ‘aliefs’ or ‘credences’, I conclude that most manifestations of superstitious thinking are best understood in terms of directly motivating imaginings: namely, as attempts to satisfy our real desires in imaginative ways.

This non-doxastic account has important normative implications. Given that imaginings don’t undergo the same constraints of beliefs, superstitions’ motivational origins and lack of evidential/inferential support might not be, in itself, epistemically faulty. Insofar as their imaginative nature is correctly identified as such at the meta-cognitive level (something that, admittedly, doesn’t always happen), a-rationality, rather than irrationality, might turn out to be superstitions’ normative domain.

David Bordonaba and Neftalí Villanueva

Affective polarization as impervious reasoning

The purpose of this paper is to defend that there exists a previously unexplored link between the phenomenon of “motivated reasoning” (Kunda 1990; Taber & Lodge 2006; Hetherington & Rudolph 2015, 77-79; Sunstein 2017, 123) and a type of polarization we deem as “impervious reasoning”.

Unlike any of the senses described in (Bramson et al. 2017), impervious reasoning, as a kind of affective polarization, is orthogonal to the point in which your group’s core beliefs locate you with respect to an ideological spectrum. If the identity the group that you identify with is linked to beliefs that fall more or less in the middle between those of the more liberally and those of the more conservatively minded, you can also become polarized, in our sense, if you let the credence that you attribute to those beliefs take you to a point where it makes no real sense for you to pay attention to opposing views. It is this kind of radicalization, rather than extremism, that can be identified in many of the studies that link polarization and democratic unstability (see, e. g. Levendusky 2013, 57 and ff.).

Even if the connection between motivated reasoning and affective polarization has been already established in the literature –it is already explicit in Taber 2006, the notion of polarization at play in this discussion has paid too much attention to processes fostering extremism, rather than to the kind of radicalization that we described when introducing the notion of impervious reasoning. Motivated reasoning, as it contributes to the length and density of the argument pool that supports your views, directly affects the credence that you attribute to those beliefs. In doing so, it makes you impervious to others’ reasons, and thus polarized.
Julien Murzi (keynote) and Lorenzo Rossi  
*True in absolutely every context*

In this talk, we offer an overview of a book on truth and paradox we are currently writing. In the first part of the talk, we set out and motivate a number of adequacy criteria for theories of truth and paradox. In the second part, we argue that the main non-classical approaches to the semantic paradoxes — structural and sub-structural alike — are revenge-prone: they breed new paradoxes they are unable to block. In the third part, we develop a novel contextualist theory that treats truth-theoretical and revenge paradoxes in a uniform way. Unlike existing contextualist approaches, our theory is compatible with all the absolute generality one could reasonably want.

Roberto Ciuni  
*Simply Fine: the Analytic way to a Belief Revision Theory*

In a recent paper, Francesco Berto presents a Simple Hyperintensional Belief Revision theory that deploys a fine-grained semantics for doxastic notions and the revision of doxastic attitudes. This semantics is based on (i) a particular kind of Kripke models for doxastic notions such as conditional and unconditionogic propal belief, (ii) a 'classical' satisfaction relation for the well-formed formulas, and (iii) a content-theoretic apparatus that assigns to each w in W its content. In this paper, I show that the logic proposed by Berto can be embedded in a suitable epistemic version of the modal and content-sensitive machinery defined by Kit Fine in a paper from 1986, and I discuss the implications of this result for Berto's framework, its application to formal epistemology and its connections with related logics for belief revision.

Alberto Tassoni  
*Unsuccessful Realism*

I present and develop a new challenge against primitivism (anti-Humeanism) about natural laws, and show how it extends to primitivism about naturalness. I conclude with some speculations about possible upshots for the nature of metaphysics.

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Jeroen Smid

*Aggregates and Their Role in the Problem of Coincident Objects*

The problem of coincident objects concerns the relation between distinct composite objects that (seemingly) coincide. Take, for example, Theseus’s ship. This composite object can stay the same while changing some of its planks. Besides the ship, the planks seem to compose another object, viz. the aggregate of the ship’s planks. Contrary to the ship, the aggregate of the ship’s planks cannot survive the replacement of any of the planks but has all of the planks essentially. The question then arises: if the ship completely coincides with its aggregate of planks while being numerically distinct, then how are they related?

The problem of coincident objects crucially depends on the distinction between a real whole or unity and the mere aggregate of its parts. The existence of aggregates is not often disputed. If there are some objects then it seems that there is also (“automatically”) an aggregate consisting of exactly those objects. In this talk I challenge this idea. I show that aggregates are similar to sets and mereological fusions but cannot be identified with either of them. We should thus either accept them as bona fide entities irreducible to anything else, or instead look for suitable paraphrases so that we can eliminate them from our theory of the world. I explain how plural quantification provides a satisfactory paraphrase and how this also dissolves the problem of coincident objects.

Maria Scarpati

*Haecceitistic Differences in Counterpart Theory*

In Ramseyan Humility, Lewis defends quidditism, saying, among other things, that such a thesis is for properties what haecceitism is for individuals. Though accepting quidditism, he pronounces himself against haecceitism. The motivation he advances here, however, is different from any of those he had provided in On the Plurality of Worlds. In Humility, Lewis says that accepting haecceitism commits one to claims of literal transworld identity of individuals – which he takes to be an unaffordable price. I will argue that this is not quite right: haecceitism may well be too expensive, but its cost is not mandatorily the one that Lewis singles out in Humility. In fact, Lewis had defined haecceitism in Plurality as the claim that there are at least some cases of haecceitistic difference between worlds, where for two worlds to differ haecceitistically is for them to differ in what they represent de re of some individuals, while not differing in any way qualitatively. Cases of this sort may be easily built without calling into play literal transworld identity at all, and even while assuming the background of a counterpart theory. After setting forth three such cases, I will approach the issue of defining a non-qualitative counterpart relation, and argue that Lewis’s metaphysics itself could importantly benefit from accepting one.

Cristina Nencha

*David Lewis and Kit Fine's Essences*

In this paper, I will argue that there is a genuine problem for Lewis’s general theory of interpretation. That theory emphasizes the virtue of charity of truthfulness. According to Lewis, the interpretation of a speaker on an occasion is the best for the purpose of making the speaker a truth-teller. This holds also in essentialist contexts. Thus, Lewis makes, if at all possible, essentialists speak truly in the contexts of their own speaking: whenever possible, Lewis makes essentialist
claims true in the contexts of their utterances.
The strategy he employs in order to achieve such a result is to say that, in the context of an utterance of an essentialist statement, we are bound to project backwards, as it were, the kind of counterparthood that must be selected in order to make that sentence true.

This strategy works well in the Kripkean cases. When the Kripkeans make claims of essentiality of origins, they speak truly in the context of their own speaking. In that context, indeed, we pick out a kind of similarity relation such that all the relevant counterparts of an individual are such that they share with that individual the same origins.

However, if we try to apply this very same strategy to Kit Fine’s cases it no longer works. And this is a problem for Lewis, if he aims to make essentialists truth-tellers. The source of the problem is that Fine, unlike Kripke, wishes to take essentialist predications to be more fine-grained than de re modal predication.

I will suggest a tentative strategy for solving this problem for the Lewisian. My proposal requires an amendment to the standard counterpart theoretic account for truth-conditions.

Abel Suñé

*A Naturalistic Account of Metaphysical Fundamentality*

A prominent view on metaphysical fundamentality, recently labelled the ontological minimality approach (OM) (Takho (forthcoming)), proposes to think of the metaphysically fundamental as the “minimally encompassing portion of reality” that God would have to create in order to duplicate this world. This can also be expressed as the proposition that the set of the fundamental cannot contain any redundant entities. James Ladyman and Don Ross (2007) have formulated a naturalistic theory of ontology submitting it as a theory of existence that rules out all metaphysically relevant sorts of redundancy. In this paper, after introducing some tools of algorithmic information theory and the basics of L&R’s theory of ontology, I argue that there is an important sort of redundancy relevant to metaphysics, pragmatic redundancy —to prefigure, the kind of idleness instantiated by common sense explanatory patterns such that there are scientific theories that explain as much as them and more besides— that is, claims to the contrary notwithstanding, admitted by Ladyman and Ross’s theory of ontology. I then argue that while removal of pragmatic redundancy cannot be considered a tool to define existence, it carves an important metametaphysical joint: its identification serves to track metaphysical fundamentality as conceived by OM. With this in mind, I suggest a way to formulate a naturalistic semi-formalised definition fundamentality.

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Enrico Terrone  
*The Appreciator’s Performance. Virtual Reality and the Ontology of Film*

The paper investigates the ontological status of works of virtual reality. I argue that these are types whose instances are appreciators’ experiences. This introduces an ontological discrepancy between works of virtual reality and films, since the latter are usually conceived of as types whose instances are screenings, not experiences. Yet, we can eliminate such a discrepancy if we treat a film, with its peculiar impression of movement, as instantiated by coupling of a screening with the human mind. We are prone to acknowledge the mediation of our mind in the construction of the instance of a cinematic work only when this mediation is made explicit by coupling our mind with a device such as special glasses, but this mediation is crucial also when our mind works on its own. In this sense, the paradigm of virtual reality can lead us to a unitary ontological account according to which both films and works of virtual reality are types that are instantiated by appreciators’ experiences.

Lisa Giombini  
*The Sound of Authenticity. Musical Plagiarism and the "Hatto scandal"*

When she died of cancer in June 2006, English pianist Joyce Hatto was hailed as a musical genius by the press. In the previous thirty years, despite illness, she had proven capable of mastering an incredible repertoire, encompassing nearly the entire keyboard literature ever composed. Prodigy of old age, she was thought to deserve a place of honour in the annals of classical music. Which, indeed, she obtained as a plagiarist, though. Hatto fake recordings, all stolen from other interpreters, have given rise to one of musical history's greatest scandal. But where does our rejection of plagiarism come from, in the first place? The topic has been at the core of a long-standing philosophical quarrel centred around art and authenticity. Drawing on this debate, my paper investigates the following questions: Why do we consider plagiarism such a dishonour so as to compromise, if discovered, aesthetic appreciation altogether? Which considerations underlie our decision on whether an artistic performance succeeds or fails? What is concealed behind our thrill when hearing a virtuoso playing? More than being just a matter of cultural or sentimental values, I argue that our interest in originality has to do with the idea of art itself as a special form of human accomplishment. Unrevealed forgery and plagiarism trigger our admiration through a form of deception: they disguise the accomplishment. There might, however, be increasing confusion in the future over what counts as a fake. Given the advances in the field of audio-visual material digital alteration, is our view of artistic authenticity going to change?

Salomé Jacob  
*The Nature of Musical Movement*

There is a widespread assumption that movement is fundamental to music. Yet, it is unclear what exactly is meant by ‘musical movement’. We may distinguish between at least two kinds of movement which have been at the centre of discussion: I call them respectively sequential movement and physical movement. Andrew Kania (2015) and Roger Scruton (1999; 2009) focus on the first kind of movement, namely the experience of movement that arises from a succession of notes. We speak for instance of a melody going upwards and downwards. Kania argues that this
movement is imaginative whereas Scruton claims that it is metaphorical. Matt Nudds (forthcoming) by contrast focuses on the experience of movement involved in the production of the sounds. He claims that one can perceive, through audition alone, information about the way sounds are produced.

This presentation argues that although sequential and physical movement are conceptually distinguished, both can fuse together in the listening experience. This suggests a particularly rich phenomenology of musical movement. I first examine the way movement is experienced in a passage from the first movement of Rachmaninov’s *Second Piano Concerto*. I then discuss the notion of sequential movement, relying mostly of Albert Bregman (1992). Section 3 considers in what sense one may be aware, through audition alone, of movement involved in the production of the sound. I expose competing views on the relation between sounds and sound-producing events. Once we have a better grasp of both sequential movement and physical movement, I consider in what sense exactly both kinds may be heard as combined together.

**Elvira Di Bona**  
*On Two Aspects of Auditory Experience*

Auditory experience has two aspects: first, it usually allows us to hear sound and sound sources as two physically separated items, as two independent things; second, it does not allow us to hear sound and sound sources as two items independently located spatially since we hear them as two spatially indistinguishable items, given that we cannot auditorily distinguish between the location occupied by sound and the location occupied by sound sources. In comparison to the medial and proximal views, the distal view of sound better accounts for these two aspects of auditory experience. In my talk, I will start by explaining how we can distinguish between hearing sound and its properties (the first aspect) and hearing sound sources by means of two different listening modalities. By claiming that we cannot make sense of the idea that we hear sound as occupying a certain location and sound sources as occupying an independent location from the one occupied by sound (the second aspect), I will then make clear in what sense sounds are heard as co-located via a comparison with the experience of visual co-location. I will conclude by explaining how the distal view accommodates both aspects of auditory experience.

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Caroline Arruda
*Moral Fetishism: A Defense*

Michael Smith (1994) argues that someone who is motivated to do what is right for the reason that it is right (read de dicto and not de re) engages in a kind of moral fetishism that is to be avoided. In this paper, I show that not only is moral fetishism not always morally bad; it is morally permissible and, in some cases, morally good.

My argument has two parts. First, I show that Smith’s argument raises a problem for any relationship we have to moral reasons. I call this Global Moral Fetishism (GMF). Second, I show that if GMF holds and moral fetishism is not problematic in one domain, it is not necessarily problematic in other domains (e.g., moral motivation). To do so, I identify a set of reasons we have from which it follows that there are reasons to be morally fetishistic. These are the reasons we have to care about the kinds of agents we are or will become (Author 2017). One way of exercising this care is to attend to the kinds of reasons for which we act in a given instance. In doing so, we are concerned both about the reasons themselves and the sense in which acting on those reasons is a reflection of the kinds of agents we are. If we can have this second set of considerations in mind, we can justifiably care that we do the right thing for the reason that it is right (and for no other reason), in that doing the right thing for the reason that it is right shapes or reflects the kinds of agents that we are. If so, it follows that moral fetishism is an important, if not essential, feature of our relationship to ourselves as (moral) agents.

Mauro Rossi
*Wellbeing as Fitting Happiness*

In this paper, we put forward a new theory of wellbeing, according to which wellbeing consists in fitting happiness. Our theory is based on three main claims. The first is that happiness consists in an overall positive balance of affective states, such as emotions, moods, and sensory pleasures. The second is that what makes these states constituents of happiness is that they are all kinds of ‘felt evaluations’, that is, affective experiences of values. The third is that emotions, moods, and sensory pleasures can be assessed as fitting or unfitting. When fitting, they are affective experiences of genuine values. Together, these claims lead to the view that wellbeing consists in an overall positive affective experience of genuine values. We argue that that our theory of wellbeing can successfully address all the main objections that have been raised against traditional happiness-based theories of wellbeing.

Maximilian Kiener
*Consent, Threats, and Interpersonal Justification*

How is it possible that the physician’s threat to abandon his patient should the patient not consent to a medical procedure vitiates subsequent consent, whereas the very same threat issued by the spouse of the patient doesn’t vitiate the patient’s consent? In this presentation, I will discuss Appelbaum’s rights-based answer to this puzzle, according to which the physician’s threat, but not the spouse’s threat, vitiates consent because the physician, unlike the spouse, lacks the right to make such a threat. My paper has three parts: (1) I will argue that Appelbaum’s rights-based account is extensionally inadequate because lacking the right to exert an influence is not enough to vitiate
consent. Drawing on an analogy to bribes, I argue that the influenced person must also be wronged in the relevant ways in order for his consent to be vitiated. (2) I will argue that Appelbaum’s rights-based account is also intensionally inadequate because (even if it could identify all cases of vitiated consent) it still gives the wrong explanation of why some of the physician’s influences but not others vitiate consent. I will support this criticism by outlining three contrasts between rights and obligations and claim that the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate influences on a patient reflects the features of obligations rather than those of rights. (3) Finally, I will present my own proposal featuring the concept of interpersonal justification. I will argue that informed consent is vitiated iff it is wholly or partly due to an illegitimate influence. An influence is illegitimate iff the physician cannot interpersonally justify to the patient that he either exerted it or tolerated its presence. The physician’s obligation to respect a patient’s autonomy and the obligation to act beneficently, as fundamental to the patient-physician relationship, provide the basis for such a justification.

Judith Würgler
The Strength of Transcendental Constitutivism

Christine Korsgaard’s transcendental defense of constitutivism in metaethics has been subjected to many criticisms. The most important ones are those of Stelio Virvidakis, Marlène Jouan and David Enoch, who sharply criticized both the idea of transcendental arguments in general and Christine Korsgaard’s more detailed argument in particular. These arguments are very strong, but they tend to make us forget the strength of the position developed by Korsgaard and her followers – among whom Julia Markovits. This strength can be better grasped by exposing some of the answers Korsgaard provides to specific objections. We will explore Korsgaard’s answers to three of them: (1) the objection from the gap between the personal and the general, (2) the objection from communitarianism and (3) the objection from internalism. The point of the paper is limited: it aims to avoid any too easy dismissal of transcendental constitutivism.
Irene Olivero
Towards a Negotiating Approach to Reference

It is (virtually) unanimously acknowledged that Putnam's Externalism applies to natural kind terms, whereas it is commonly believed that the main criticisms of his semantic theory arise because of his proposal of extending such a theory to artifactual and social kind terms. However, Putnam’s account already faces problems in explaining the semantics of words of the former kind. The aim of this talk is twofold: explaining why we should abandon Putnam’s semantic view, and proposing a different, more tenable approach to reference – what I label a “Negotiating Approach to Reference”. I start by laying out some core controversial examples. My purpose is to give evidence that the source of the controversies is rooted in the fact that Putnam’s Externalism implicitly relies on a hyperrealist view on modality, a view that notoriously encounters several criticisms. In order to bypass those problems, Thomasson proposes an alternative approach to modality: Modal Normativism. This deflationary approach presupposes that there are rules of use that are meaning constitutive. Consequently, adopting Thomasson’s Modal Normativism – I show – commits us to abandon Putnam’s Externalism and to embrace a hybrid theory of reference. The combination of these two alternative approaches – I illustrate – results in a “Negotiating Approach to Reference”, an account that not only preserves the strengths of Putnam’s theory, but that can also account for the controversial cases associated with his semantic theory. On this approach, we can explain the disputes that arise around our kind words in terms of negotiations about how those words ought to be applied, rather than on how they are actually applied. By adopting this view – I argue – we gain a more tenable and persuasive explanation of how the semantics of our kind terms works.

Stefan Rinner
Naive Russellians and Schiffer's Puzzle

Neo-Russellians like Salmon and Braun hold that: (A) The semantic contents of sentences are structured proposition whose basic components are objects and properties, (B) names are directly referential terms, and (C) 'n believes that S' is true in a context c iff the referent of the name n in c believes the proposition expressed by S in c. This is sometimes referred to as 'the Naive Russellian theory'. In this paper, I will discuss the Naive Russellian theory primarily in connection with a problem known as Schiffer's puzzle. The puzzle was first designed by Schiffer to show that the Naive Russellian theory is not consistent with a principle known as Frege's constraint, since it is committed to what Schiffer calls 'the special-case consequence'. Since Frege's constraint appears to be a self-evident truth, this would undermine the Naive Russellian theory. Salmon and Braun reply that although the Naive Russellian theory is committed to Frege's constraint, it is not committed to the special-case consequence. In this paper, I will argue with a new Schiffer-case that even if the Naive Russellian theory is not committed to the special-case consequence, it is not consistent with Frege's constraint.

Filippo Ferrari and Erik Stei
Logic, Norms, and Reasoning

We are concerned with the question: is logic normative? We first outline and critically assess a somehow liberal taxonomy of the normative which—by distinguishing between three ways in
which logic might be said to be normative—gives us a framework for better frame the question. We then introduce a distinction between three levels of logic: pure logic, applied logic and the level of system design. With this in hand, the question whether logic is normative becomes the question whether and in what sense is each level of logic normative. We take this first result to be already of significant value in the current debate on the normativity of logic since it helps us in getting clearer about what exactly we are asking when we ask whether logic is normative. In the second, more explorative, part of the paper we proceed by critically assess three conjectures concerning the normativity pertaining to each level of logic. First, we conjecture that pure logic, if normative at all, is normative in only a minimal sense (what we call merely criterial normativity). Second, we take applied logic to be normative in a much more robust sense (involving what we call axiological normativity). Third, we conceive of the level of system design as being subject to a conditional kind of directive normativity—depending on the specific purpose the logician has in mind in designing a certain logical system.

Stefan Rinner  
*Brains in Vats and Semantic Externalism: New Hope for the Skeptic*

Different thought experiments have been offered to argue for the skeptical claim that sound empirical knowledge is impossible. One of these thought experiments assumes that we are eternal brains in a vat with systematically delusory experiences. In (Putnam 1981), Putnam responds to the skeptical challenge that contrary to our initial assumption we can know a priori, i.e. independent from experience, that we aren’t eternal brains in a vat. Putnam argues that the skeptical hypothesis that we are eternal brains in a vat is inconsistent with the received view regarding reference and truth, semantic externalism, which says that a referential expression e refers to an object o if and only if e is appropriately causally related to o. There are different versions of Putnam's argument. In this paper, I will discuss the three main versions of the argument; i.e. a reconstruction of Putnam's original argument in (Putnam 1981), Brueckner's simple argument (Brueckner 2003; 2016, Section 3 and 4), and a reconstruction of Brueckner's disjunctive argument (Brueckner 2016, Section 4). It is generally assumed that Putnam's original argument does not show that the skeptical hypothesis that we are eternal brains in a vat is inconsistent with semantic externalism. In this paper, I will argue that the same is true of Brueckner's simple argument and of Brueckner's disjunctive argument. Although from this it won't follow that semantic externalism is consistent with the skeptical hypothesis, it will show that it is also not yet decided that it is not.
Laura Candiotto

*Dialogue as Vehicle of Group Knowledge. Epistemic Cooperation and Cognitive Transformation*

Why and how could we acquire knowledge through social interactions, and specifically through dialogue?

My answer says that dialogue is a distributed and extended tool of group cognition and, thus, I depict the why as the extended nature of the epistemic agency and the how as epistemic cooperation.

Although many accounts about group knowledge/group belief may be helpful to properly understand the process of knowledge-building through dialogical interactions, I first argue that the distributed account is the one with a stronger explanatory power. Adopting the argument for the best explanation, I challenge the ordinary model of group knowledge/group belief – the summative account for which a group is the sum of its components and the group belief is a sum of individual beliefs – and introduce the distributed one for replying to its shortcomings, also clarifying why it is the best among the non-summative accounts.

Then, I look at the literature on the extended cognition, and I argue for an integration between the extended and the distributed model regarding group knowledge. Doing so I achieve a more refined answer to my question for which dialogical interactions could be understood as one of the most prominent cases of socially extended cognition. Extended cognition is relevant for my argument because it allows understanding epistemic cooperation - the central notion of the distributed model - as cognitive extension. In conclusion, we achieve knowledge through dialogical interactions because the network of relationships embedded in dialogical inquiry displays the level of cooperation required for the emergence of cognitive transformation as group knowledge. This means that the cognitive achievement is realised through the integration of external resources - in our case, group members as interlocutors - and, thus, that dialogical interactions are extended tools for group knowledge.

Giulia Martina

*Smell and Objectivity*

In this paper I argue that smells and their qualities are objective and independent of perceivers. Moreover, we can fully explain the way things appear in olfactory experience in terms of our awareness of these objective smells and qualities.

My first goal is to show that our ordinary ways of thinking and talking about smells are in agreement with this view. To achieve my goal, I propose an analysis on which our statements about how things smell (e.g. the tea smells floral) 1) are primarily about smells, as opposed to sources of smells, and 2) have an implicit comparative structure. Rather than directly attributing properties to smells (e.g. the property of being floral), these statements characterise smells in terms of their similarities to smells typically given off by certain kinds of sources. This account of our discourse about smells, coupled with an objectivist view of smells and their qualities, best explains some of our communicative practices (e.g. expectations and disagreement).

My second goal is to show that an objectivist view of smells can account for how things appear to us in olfactory experience. Empirical research has revealed widespread intersubjective differences: the same thing smells different to different subjects depending on their sensitivity, past experience and associations (e.g. Stevenson et al. 1995, 2001). I argue that we can explain these appearances without either denying that olfaction presents us with the mind-independent world or positing
experience-dependent olfactory qualities. Given the comparative analysis, I show that the subjects’ statements are only apparently incompatible and can be made true by the very same smells and qualities. Moreover, I advance an objectivist explanation of how different similarities between the perceived smell and other smells can be more or less salient depending the context and the subject’s past experiences.

Silvano Zipoli Caiani and Gabriele Ferretti
*How the Propositional and the Motoric come together*

One of the most interesting issues in contemporary philosophy of the mind is determining how intentions, which are mental phenomena coming in a propositional format, relate to motor representations, which are mental states by definition provided with a motor format (henceforth: MRs).

Since intentions and MRs have different formats, it is not clear how we can explain the way in which they interlock. This problem is known as the interface problem (Butterfill and Sinigaglia 2014; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2016).

In this paper, we propose a new account concerning the interlock between intentions and MRs, showing that the interface problem is not as deep as previously proposed. Before discussing our view, we report the ideas developed in the literature by those who have tried to solve this puzzle before us. The paper proceeds as follows. First, we respectively address the proposals by Butterfill and Sinigaglia (2014) and by Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2016) and argue that both solutions entail a translation between representational formats, which, however, both accounts aim to avoid. Then, we present our brand-new claim, supported by empirical evidence, according to which intentions and MRs partially share the same motor format, inasmuch as executable action concepts are naturally represented in the agent’s motor system together with action’s outcomes. Indeed, since intentions are constituted by executable action concepts and since there is empirical evidence that action concepts are represented (and, thus, built) in the same motor format as action outcomes, the interlock between intentions and MRs no longer constitutes a problem: executable action concepts are the motor mediators between intentions and motor representations.

Alessandra Buccella
*Perceptual Constancy is Dead, Long Live Perceptual Constancy!*

Perceptual constancy is a heterogenous psychological phenomenon. Experiencing a table as rectangular even though the image projected on the retina is not (it is probably trapezoidal), taking a person to be of constant height even though, as she moves closer to us, she occupies a larger portion of our visual field, or having a general experience of a stable world even though, as we move around, the proximal stimuli on our sense organs’ detectors are a noisy, disorganized, and ever-changing manifold.

The traditional account of what constancy consists in assumes that, in order to display constancy, a perceptual system needs to be able to retrieve, attribute, and keep track of specific distal properties of objects throughout changes both in proximal stimulation and contextual features (e.g. illumination in the case of color constancy).

Even though this is by far the most prominent view of what perceptual constancy is, it faces objections. In this paper, I discuss a couple of worries for the traditional model of constancy, and I argue that the tradition should be more careful in how it takes their view to be supported by empirical evidence.

As an alternative, I propose an account of perceptual constancy which is independent of distal property attribution and tracking. Following Gibson (1979), I suggest replacing the notion of constancy with the notion of invariant. Invariants are neither properties of objects nor cognitive
representations of subjects (e.g. memories, beliefs, etc.). Instead, they capture the stable relations between the perceiver and its environment. An understanding of constancy in terms of sensitivity to invariants is, on the one hand, less prone to the worries vexing the traditional account and, on the other hand, more easily integrated into a broader picture centered on the role of perceptual capacity in action coordination.
- September the 5th -
morning
Alfred Mele (keynote)
*Free will and neuroscience*

A major source of scientific skepticism about free will is the belief that conscious decisions and intentions never play a role in producing corresponding actions. I present three serious problems encountered by any attempt to justify this belief by appealing to existing neuroscientific data. Experiments using three different kinds of technology are discussed: EEG, fMRI, and depth electrodes. I focus on three questions: When are decisions made (or intentions acquired) in the experiments at issue? When, in these experiments, is the point of no return reached for the featured overt actions? And can we properly generalize from the experimenters’ alleged findings to all decisions?

Giacomo Andreoletti
*Free Will as the Ability to Contemplate Alternatives*

The contemporary debate about free will features two different families of conceptions of what is the nature of a free willed action. The first one is what is termed ‘leeway conception’ of free will, whereas the second is the ‘sourcehood conception’ (Timpe 2017) of free will. In short, the leeway conception has it that someone is free as long as she has genuine robust alternatives ahead of her. On the other hand, according to a sourcehood conception, someone is free as long as she is the ultimate source of what she does. In this paper I put forward a tentative idea about a possible aspect of free will that has perhaps been overlooked thus far. The basic idea is that there is a sense according to which we are free as long as we have the ability to contemplate and take into account alternatives that deviate from the inertial ways we conduct our lives. I also argue that this aspect does not overlap neither with the traditional leeway nor with the sourcehood conception.

Sofia Bonicalzi
*Moral Responsibility: A Two-Tier Account*

The aim of the talk is to frame a two-tier account of moral responsibility which combines the insights, while avoiding the drawbacks, of both internalist and externalist actual-sequence compatibilist views. In particular, I defend the claim that a self-disclosure view, adequately supported by an account of normative competence, could give reason of many of our usages of the concept of responsibility. First, I claim that one must distinguish between cases in which the action reveals something morally relevant about the agent, and cases where it does not. The leading intuition is thus that, in cases of responsibility, the agent’s motivational structure is explanatory relevant with respect to the action, in a way that makes the agent able to identify with it. However, differently from classic internalist real-self views, identification will not concern individual mental states: recognising the action as a final step in the deliberative process she goes through, the agent identifies with the result of the global decision-making process. In this sense, responsible agency will be based on the encompassing capacity to reflect upon intentional actions as unified phenomena, and on the exercise of a broad metacognitive regulation of one’s own behaviour. In the second part of the talk, I will discuss how externalist integrations, in terms of rational control, are needed in order to provide a functioning framework, able to deal with cases of irrationality/extreme distance from moral standards. For the condition of normative control to be satisfied, the agent must
be able to accept intersubjectively recognised reasons for action as compelling motives. To sum up, claiming that X is responsible for the action Y would imply that (1) the action Y reveals something morally relevant about X (internalist constraint) and (2) X is a rational decision-maker who is sensitive to standard moral reasons (externalist constraint).

Andrea Guardo

*Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality*

Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. This is what Street calls the “Kantian basis” of constructivism.

In the first part of the paper, I show that the Kantian basis thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons. When Street says that constructivism about practical reasons is entailed from within every possible normative point of view, what she has in mind is that a certain argument for constructivism, her Darwinian Dilemma, is sound relative to every possible normative point of view. But the Darwinian Dilemma relies on two assumptions about epistemic reasons, and if constructivism is the correct view of epistemic reasons, then there are possible normative points of view relative to which these two assumptions are false. This raises an interesting issue. Street uses the Kantian basis thesis (1) to argue that realists about practical reasons can be proved wrong employing only assumptions they themselves are committed to and (2) to answer the worry that constructivism, if true, would be trivial. What happens to these arguments if the Kantian basis thesis is false? In the second part of the paper I answer this question by arguing, first, that all real-life realists about practical reasons can be proved wrong employing only assumptions they themselves are committed to and, second, that the triviality objection can be answered by rejecting the notion that constructivism about practical reasons is itself a judgment about practical reasons.

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Anandi Hattiangadi (keynote)

*Semantic Supervenience and Haecceities*

It is almost universally accepted that semantic properties—such as meaning and content—
supervene on some class of non-semantic properties. This is roughly to say that any two possible
worlds that are alike in non-semantic respects are alike in semantic respects. More precisely,

**Semantic Supervenience.** For any two metaphysically possible worlds, \( w \) and \( w' \), and for any
two individuals, \( x \) in \( w \) and \( y \) in \( w' \), any isomorphism between \( x \) and \( y \) that preserves non-
semantic properties preserves semantic properties.

In this paper, I take issue with Semantic Supervenience. I start by assuming haecceitism, the view
that in addition to qualitative properties, such as having a certain mass or height, there are
haecceitistic properties, such as the property of being identical to Socrates. I argue that, assuming
haecceitism, friends of Semantic Supervenience face a dilemma. On the first horn of the dilemma, if
the non-semantic properties that figure in the supervenience base are assumed to be purely
qualitative properties, Semantic Supervenience is false (Magidor and Kearns 2012). On the second
horn of the dilemma, if the non-semantic properties in the supervenience base are assumed to
include all non-semantic haecceitistic properties, this trivializes Semantic Supervenience. The
remainder of the paper considers and rejects responses to this dilemma, such as denying haecceitism
or including some but not all haecceitistic properties in the supervenience base.

Simona Aimar

*A Semantic Argument for Events of Causation*

Contemporary accounts of causal claims say that causatives pick up a relation of causation. But the
interaction of causative and temporal modifiers provides us with evidence for the view that all
causative verbs pick up a complex event of causation. I develop this unified truth-conditional
semantics of causal claims. I show how this semantics entails that ordinary causal talk presupposes
that causation is an event, and has implications for the metaphysics of causation.

Andrea Raimondi and Andrea Guardo

*Yet Another Victim of Kripkenstein’s Monster*

The most popular approach to the naturalization of meaning in the contemporary debate is
dispositionalism (see, e.g., Dretske 1981 and Fodor 1990). According to a simple version of it, what
makes it the case that by ‘+’ I mean addition is that my dispositions concerning this symbol track
the addition function. Kripke (1981) argued that such analyses cannot work. Two of the main
problems he raised are the following: on the one hand, the totality of my dispositions seems to cover
only a finite segment of the addition function, for if \( M \) and \( N \) are two huge numbers and \( P \) is their
sum, I am not disposed to answer ‘\( P \)’ if asked for ‘\( M + N \)’; on the other hand, some of us have
dispositions to make mistakes.

In a recent paper, Jared Warren (forthcoming) elaborates a notion of disposition that is able to solve
these problems. In our paper, we argue that Warren fails to address a third problem, which is fatal to
any attempt to naturalize meaning that is couched in disposition-al terms (see Gibbard 2012 for a
similar dispositionalist approach). Although Warren’s strategies to show that some dispositions of ours do track the addition function succeed, other dispositions of ours do not. Let us call the first set of dispositions "the addition-tracking dispositions" and the second one "the non-addition-tracking dispositions" and let us assume that a subset of our non-addition-tracking dispositions tracks another function, say quaddition (see Kripke 1982). The only way dispositionalists can avoid the conclusion that by ‘+’ we mean both addition and quaddition is by explaining why only our addition-tracking dispositions, and not our quaddition-tracking dispositions, are relevant to the issue of what we mean. We argue that this cannot be done, at least not without abandoning the naturalistic assumptions behind the dispositionalist's project.

Bartosz Kaluziński
Towards Constitutive Normativity of Meaning

The thesis that “meaning is a normative notion” became influential due to the book 'Wittgenstein on rules and private language' (1982) by Kripke. Although that thesis is catchy and many philosophers support it (Boghossian 1989; Buleandra 2008; Brandom 1994; Ebbs 1997; McDowell 1984; Millar 2004; Peregrin 2012; Whiting 2007), it is not clear how that thesis should be understood. Usually, normativists about meaning assume that the meaning of a given linguistic expression produces pragmatic obligations as how we ought to use that expression. They claim that following semantic norm:

\[(SN) \, t \text{ means } F \rightarrow \forall x \, (t \text{ applies correctly to } x \rightarrow x \text{ is } f)\]

produces pragmatic obligation:

\[(PN) \, S \text{ means } F \text{ by } t \rightarrow \forall x \, (S \text{ ought to apply } t \text{ to } x \rightarrow x \text{ is } f)\]

where t is a term, F is the phrase stating its meaning, x is a variable and f is a feature by virtue of which t relates to x and S is a speaker.

Abovementioned interpretation of the normativity of meaning thesis brought serious criticism (Bilgrami 1993; Glüer 1999; Hattiangadi 2007; Wikforss 2001; Boghossian 2005):

A. It has counterintuitive consequences when it comes to lying or using irony (we always ought to speak the truth; when we apply the term “horse” to cow in order to make an ironic statement we to not ascribe to that term its standard meaning).

B. It is doubtful whether (SN) can produce (PN) “just like that”. Usually, anti-normativists claim that “correct” in (SN) can be used in both normative and non-normative way, and they ask for an argument supporting the claim that in (SN) it is indeed used in a normative way.

I intend to outline an alternative reading of the normativity of meaning thesis along the lines of constitutive normativity that will prevent these difficulties from arising.
Delia Belleri

*Deflationary Projects in Ontology: Analytic Methods, Mind-independence and Dialectical Seclusion*

The focus of this paper are deflationary ontological theories described by their proponents as (i) forms of realism, which (ii) employ analytic methods in order to settle questions of existence (see B. Hale and C. Wright 2001; A. Thomasson 2007, 2015). These theories aim to be forms of realism that are sufficiently in continuity with more inflationary projects: in both cases, ontology ought to be understood as an investigation into what exists independently of our minds. However, I argue that combining realism with the use of analytic methods leads to a revised conception of mind independence, which threatens the continuity between deflationary and inflationary projects. The revision has to do with the fact that "existing mind-independently" becomes compatible with "being discovered through analytic methods", while it manifestly wasn't compatible in the tradition prior to deflationary approaches, which largely rested on the idea that existence questions cannot be established analytically (cf. Dorr 2005). Now, why is this departure from tradition a problem? I argue that the dialectical position occupied by deflationary projects is negatively affected: these proposals are threatened by what I wish to call “dialectical seclusion”. By combining realism with the use of analytic methods, they revise both substantive and methodological commitments in such a way that the resulting proposal is too far removed from inflationary options to constitute a palatable alternative for both the opponents of deflationism and for third, neutral parties. The position would remain dialectically secluded because parties who wished to preserve continuity in the practice of ontology would have little reason to embrace it. This would be true even if, as the deflationist may point out, inflationary accounts were seriously flawed due, e.g., to epistemic deficiencies: deflationist theories might still offer an alternative that is too hard to swallow, if continuity with inflationary approaches is valued.

Luca Zanetti

*Grounding and Auto-Abstraction*

In this paper I outline an account of Fregean abstraction in terms of grounding, alternative to the one suggested by Rosen (2010) and Schwartzkopff (2011) and developed by Donaldson (2017). The main difference from these other approaches is that my account places substantial restrictions on acceptable instances of 'grounded' abstraction principles. After some preliminary remarks, in Sect. 2 I try to make sense of the claim that the right-hand side of an abstraction principle is prior to its left-hand side. In Sect. 3 I claim that this priority thesis naturally motivates an independence constraint, and I examine three ways in which this constraint can be enforced.

Bahram Assadian

*Abstraction Principles: Freedom and Arrogance*

In the abstractionist philosophy of mathematics, Hume's Principle tells us that the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs if and only if the Fs and the Gs are one-to-one correlated. But what is the semantic function of 'The number of Fs'? Following Frege, the abstractionists Bob Hale and
Crispin Wright argue that such numerals must be taken as genuinely singular terms effecting reference to particular objects. I will explore the prospects of a different semantic interpretation of 'The number of Fs' in the abstractionist setting. According to this conception, the numeral is to be understood in terms of the Russellian quantificational account of definite descriptions in which the numeral asserts the existence and uniqueness of an object. The corresponding formulation of Hume's Principle generates a version of the Bad Company Objection: what separates Hume's Principle from its Russellian analogue? Is there any reason to dismiss the latter as an instance of a “bad” abstraction principle? I will argue that Hale and Wright’s own answer in terms of the requirement of singular reference does not work, and will propose a novel strategy for defending Hume's Principle against the threat of its Russellian company.
Silvano Zipoli Caiani

*Semantic Biases in Vision for Action: An Explanatory Issue for Radical Enactivism*

Radical Enactivism holds that the best explanation of basic forms of cognition is provided without involving information processing of any sort. According to this view, the ability to perceive visual affordances should be accounted for in terms of extensional covariations between variables spanning the agent’s body and the environment. Contrary to Radical Enactivism, I argue that the intensional properties of cognition cannot be ignored, and that the way in which an agent represents the world has consequences all the way down to basic sensorimotor abilities. To support this claim, I show that the perception of visual affordances is not segregated from higher forms of cognition; rather, it is modulated by the agent’s ability to recognize the semantic identity of the visual target. Accordingly, since the semantic recognition of an object involves a way of representing it under a certain description, it can be inferred that the perception of visual affordances cannot be accounted for without considering the intensional properties of cognition. This poses an explanatory issue for Radical Enactivism.

Francesco Marchi

*Competing Representations: Toward a New Theory of Attention*

There is no agreement on what attention is and how it actually works. Is it an independent mechanism that selects perceptual contents? Is it more concerned with modulation and boosting of other processes rather than selection? Is it a built-in feature of perceptual and cognitive systems? Is it a way of perceiving and cognizing? Is it exclusively a subject-level phenomenon? There are many different views about attention on the table, but the debate on how attention should be understood is far from settled. The aim of this paper is to provide the building blocks of a theory of attention that may overcome the shortcomings of many alternative views, by bringing together everyday intuitions, basic considerations about neural processing and experimental results in attention research. I argue for and expand upon an increasingly popular theory of attention, namely the biased-competition theory, by comparison to alternative views and in the light of some basic intuitions about attention that have driven research on this topic since the beginning. I propose a philosophical account of attention that characterizes it as a property of competing representations. I discuss and evaluate prominent theories of attention, arguing that none of them meets a desideratum on an adequate theory of attention based on everyday intuitions and fundamental features of neuronal systems. I then present the biased-competition theory of attention in detail and argue that it fares better than the alternatives. I then expand on the biased-competition theory, toward an explanation of attention as the property of “being the current winner” of a biased-competition process among representations. The picture of attention and attentional processes that emerges from this paper serves as a new benchmark for discussing the nature and the role of attention in perception and cognition.

Arzu Gokmen

*Sense of Minimal Self, Self and the Others: Implications of Predictive Processing*

Jakob Hohwy proposes a mapping between Predictive Processing (PP) and the phenomenological aspects of the mind. He claims that the sense of minimal self, which is the feeling that the present
experience or the action is mine, is underpinned and arisen by individual’s need for optimizing the generative models and to minimize the prediction error. But, he takes a few steps further and offers a reductionism of self to an ‘agent-bound sensory trajectory’. That is, he believes that there is nothing more to self than the sense of self (sense of mineness) which is the cognitive backdrop to the organism’s commerce with the external world. This leads to the conclusion that there is no entity which is self and our sense of self is causally explained by PP. I claim that Hohwy’s attempt to explain sense of minimal self needs ramifications and that his reductionism is unjustified within the framework that he describes. He proposes that the sense of mineness is the feeling of familiarity when the predictions come true, and that this feeling vanishes when there is no match between the prediction and the reality, or when we bewildered. I think that the success of the prediction cannot be taken necessary for the sense of minimal self to arise; rather, encountering a world (the others), modeling that world, and testing the models through ongoing encounters, seems to be enough for the sense of self to arise. Moreover, prediction error (surprise) rather than the prediction success seems to imply more evidence for the sense of self. I further claim that, the framework of PP can give an explanation only to when or how we become aware of the sense of minimal self; but this doesn't yet justify the reductionism of self to sense of self.

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Adriano Mannino


Of the 3226 philosophers who took the PhilPapers survey (Bourget/Chalmers 2013), 72.8% indicate that they reject theism, i.e. that they accept or lean toward atheism. Among philosophers of religion, however, 72.3% accept or lean toward theism. Two competing hypotheses may explain this epistemic data. First, the hypothesis of expert knowledge: Philosophers of religion may possess expert knowledge on the arguments for and against God’s existence, and the pro arguments are overall more convincing. Second, the hypothesis of self-selection bias: People often become philosophers of religion because they are religious, or have a high credence in God’s existence. Based on empirical data gathered by De Cruz (2013), I argue that the self-selection hypothesis is true and the expert knowledge hypothesis false, and that a rescuing hypothesis is false as well: It is not the case that expert knowledge favouring theism is still reflected in the fact that philosophers of religion convert more often to theism than to atheism while acquiring expertise in the field. In fact, the numbers show that the ratio of theists to atheists declines with exposure to philosophy of religion.

This raises the question whether self-selection effects plague other subfields of philosophy as well. People with physicalist leanings may prefer advancing science to doing philosophy of science or metaphysics; rational egoists may tend to avoid moral philosophy; political philosophy is unattractive to utilitarians, for whom politics reduces to social science; and animal ethics attracts animal-friendly people. However, I argue that it makes a big difference whether a subfield is a relic of once dominant views (cf. philosophy of religion/theology) or whether it is novel (cf. animal ethics). Epistemic change over time, individual and collective, enables us to extrapolate what ideal experts would likely come to believe; and ideal experts are the ones we rationally ought to trust.

Giorgio Volpe

Knowing that Peter, Rather than Anyone Else, Stole the Rubies. A Contrastivist Response to Gerken’s Arguments for False Positives

In this paper I propose to defend the contrastivist claim that knowledge is a three-place relation between an agent, a proposition (or a fact) and a contrast against a line of criticism due to Mikkel Gerken. He considers this case: Last night, Peter robbed the jewelry store. He smashed the window, forced open the locked safe, and stole the rubies inside. But Peter forgot to wear gloves. He also forgot about the security camera. Today, Mary the detective has been called to the scene to investigate. So far she has the following evidence. She has been told that there was a theft, she has found and identified Peter’s fingerprints on the safe, and she has seen and recognized Peter on the security video, filmed in the act of forcing open the safe. She has no further information.

This vignette was originally employed by Jonathan Schaffer and Joshua Knobe in an empirical study where participants took part in just one of two different conditions, being asked to what extent they agreed either with the knowledge ascription that Mary now knows that Peter rather than anyone else stole the rubies or with the knowledge ascription that Mary now knows that Peter stole the rubies rather than anything else. The findings were that participants in the first condition were more inclined to agree with the knowledge ascription they were asked to consider than participants in the second condition, and the difference was statistically significant, providing empirical evidence of a contrast effect. Gerken’s own epistemic and doxastic ‘arguments for false positives’
do not question the existence of this effect, but challenge the contrastivist claim that it provides evidence of a ternary structure of knowledge. I try to show that Gerken’s arguments are ultimately unsuccessful.

Silvia Milano
Bayesian Beauty

The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic example of how self-locating uncertainty creates problems for the Bayesian principles of Conditionalisation and Reflection. Furthermore, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. I show that, contrary to what is commonly accepted, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly represented, the solution satisfies all the standard Bayesian principles, including Conditionalisation and Reflection, is immune from Dutch Books, and does not make any appeal to the Restricted Principle of Indifference which, I argue, is incompatible with the essential features of Bayesian reasoning. Moreover, it emerges from my discussion that the disagreement between different solutions proposed in the literature does not undermine standard arguments for Bayesianism and is not due to the inapplicability of Bayesianism to centered settings, but is instead an instance of the familiar problem of setting the priors.

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When we read literature we fill out what is ontologically incomplete by conceiving it as if it were complete. Sure enough literary objects – as Roman Ingarden underlines in The literary work of Art (1931/1973) –, differently from real ones, are characterized by spots of indeterminacy, i.e. are not determined under every aspect, hence are nothing but schemas, full of gaps (independently of any additional epistemological incompleteness which may derive from inaccurate readings) that need to be concretized by our acts of reading. This peculiar feature of literature makes clear why in comparison with being engaged with books, being engaged with films is imaginatively impoverished: because there are less elements of indeterminacy, i.e. less gaps in the work to be filled up. The point here is, as Wolfgang Iser in The implied reader (1978) remarks, that the reader is able to visualize the main character for himself and when the character is offered, concretized by a complete and immutable picture, then the work of imagination is out of action. The intrinsic incompleteness of literature also makes clear why projects as the one of Brian Davis (http://thecomposites.tumblr.com), based on the idea of doing with literary characters what the police does with composite portraits of criminals somehow is more effort than it’s worth: our imagination is able to fill up the gaps, whereas the software, reproducing nothing but incomplete objects, isn’t. No software can make Madame Bovary come alive, our help is needed.

Marta Benenti
Expressive Properties and the Challenge of the Separable Experiences

Expressive experience consists in the experience of objects as expressing affective states. The talk aims at framing the problem of expressive experience and of the kind of properties that it entails in terms of the so-called “heresy of the separable experience” (Budd 1985). Most theories consider expressive properties as characterizing the response that is causally triggered by some perceptual properties of artworks. I therefore argue that such accounts are committed to the heresy of the separable experience, that is, they cannot provide any rationale between perceptual properties that are constitutive of the look of the artwork and expressive properties. After considering the possibility that there might be no way out of this separation, I suggest that a perceptual strategy supported by empirical results might fruitfully deal with the challenge.

Patrik Engisch
Fiction, Imagination, and Narrative

The traditional idea that there is a sharp distinction between fiction and non-fiction has been recently forcefully criticized by Derek Matravers (Matravers 2014). According to him, the best way to account for this distinction would be to espouse some form of the “consensus view” (CV, for short) according to which there is a conceptual route that starts from the notion of a prescription to imagine and that leads to an elucidation of the distinction between fictional and non-fictional representations (Matravers 2014: 3). However, he argues that there is no such route: not only does the notion of a prescription to imagine plays no role in an account of our engagement with fictions, it also plays no role in an account of our processing of their content. Hence, we should give up on any sharp distinction between fiction and non-fiction.
However, Kathleen Stock recently offered a new defense of CV supposedly immune to Matravers’
criticism (Stock 2017). She agrees with him that the claim that we engage differently with works of
fiction and non-fiction is mistaken but denies that we process similarly their contents. That is, for
some specific notion of imagination that she calls “F-imagining” (Stock 2017: 20), she claims that
authors of fictions prescribe us to F-imagine their content in a way authors of non-fictions cannot.
Hence, she concludes that some modified version of the CV remains immune to Matravers’
criticism.
In this paper, I argue that the alternative offered by Stock fails and that Matravers’ critic still stands:
her introduction of F-imagining amounts to a problematic restriction of a broader notion of
imagining whose deployment is prescribed not only by fiction but, rather, by narratives of any kind.

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Davood Hosseini
Quantifier Variance without Meaning Variance

Quantifier variance entails that ‘there exists’ has more than one meaning. A problem with this view is that in virtue of what are all of these meanings quantifiers’ meaning? If there is no such an explanation, those meanings would not be meanings of the same thing (the problem of meaning variance). A reasonable candidate is the formal rules governing quantification, but it suffers from a notorious objection (the collapse argument): there cannot be more than one quantifier obeying the same rules, up to logical equivalence. I will argue that quantifier variance should admit a many-sorted language in order to block the collapse argument. Then, I will propose a Kaplanian thesis about the meaning of sorted quantifiers that saves quantifier variance from meaning variance.

Francesco Spada
From Bradley's Regress to the Regresses of Instantiation: Toward a Common Solution

The goal of this paper is to provide and defend a common solution to three regress arguments which may be - and have been - put forward to rebut the claim that there are universals and facts as structured entities made out of particulars and universals. These arguments have been recently discussed by Eklund, who refers to them as the infinity regress, the dependence regress and the constitution regress. Each regress relies on the idea that, if S is red, the existence of S and redness is not enough for S to be red: for S to be red, S must instantiate redness. But for S to instantiate redness, the existence of S, redness and instantiation is not enough: S and redness must stand in instantiation, etc.. My proposal is that, if we can establish that all the facts in the endless sequence are one and the same fact, each regress is blocked. This paper is a defense of this claim.

Niall Paterson
Dispositions & Token Identity

What is the relationship between dispositions and their causal bases, for instance, fragility and molecular structure, or belief and states of the brain? According to The Identity Theory: Dispositions are identical to their causal bases.
What are causal bases? The causal basis of a given disposition is simply that property, or that conjunction of properties if there are many, which is/are causally responsible for the disposition’s manifestations.
As the well-told story goes, if ‘dispositions’ and ‘causal bases’ are taken to denote types, then the identity theory is false, due to the problem of multiple realisability. If the identity theory holds at the type-type level, then given multiple realisability, we may run a reductio, and thereby derive a contradiction. Orthodoxy has it that proponents may avoid the reductio by endorsing a token-token, rather than a type-type identity relation. In this paper I challenge this orthodox view: moves from type-type to token-token identities then, no matter what else we may say, so long as they are motivated by multiple realisation, are dialectically inert.
I will show that there exists a class of the multiply realised dispositions, such that the members of that class have what I call disjunctive causal bases. A causal basis is disjunctive just in case some of its manifestations are caused by some unique causal basis x, some are caused by some unique causal basis y (such that y > x), and the rest (if any remain) by both x and y. I show that dispositions
with disjunctive causal bases are as threatening to the token-token identity theory as the standard cases of multiple realisability are for type-type identity theories. The reason is that such cases involve multiple realisation at the token level. Because of this, the reductio may be re-run using token, rather than type identity relations.

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- September the 5th - afternoon
AULA CS3
IUSS Symposium on Philosophy of Mind and Subjectivity
Invited speaker: Marie Guillot: *The Case For Me-Ness*

**Alfredo Paternoster**  
*The Inflation of the Subjective*

In a recent paper, Marie Guillot distinguishes three different conceptions of what philosophers call ‘subjective character’: for-me-ness, me-ness and mineness. Shortly put, for-me-ness is awareness of experience; me-ness is awareness of the subject; mineness is awareness of the subject as being the owner of the experience.

I shall argue that, while this distinction is of some help in clarifying the nature of subjective experience, there is no evidence that me-ness and mineness refer to actual properties of experience. In the light of this, I shall propose a somewhat deflationary view of subjective character, according to which an experience can be said to involve a phenomenally salient reference to the subject only in the quite limited sense that certain proprioceptive states carry information on one’s own body (e.g., the so-called bodily self). On this view, me-ness and mineness are constituents of a psychological self-consciousness without a clear, determinate counterpart in experience.

I will defend this point of view basing on arguments of two different kinds: first, I will provide an analysis of a paradigm case of an experiential state, showing that in this state there is no phenomenal or introspective evidence either of me-ness or of mineness; all we can say is that proprioception is different from perception. Second, I will address the case of de-personalization syndromes, arguing that the alleged phenomenology involved, such as feeling one’s own pain as if it was not one’s own pain, is the result of a complex introspective elaboration in which concepts and cognitive representations play a dominant role.

**Alberto Barbieri**  
*What Is at Issue in the For-me-ness of Experience? Clarify and Taxonomize the Problem of For-me-ness*

An ever-increasing number of philosophers advocate for the existence of for-me-ness (Fasching, 2009; Gallagher, 2017; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Klein, 2015; Kriegel, 2009b; Levine, 2001; Rochat, 2011; Strawson, 2011; Zahavi, 2003; Zahavi & Kriegel, 2015; Zahavi, Siderits, & Thompson, 2011). Furthermore, for most of them, for-me-ness is such an ubiquitous aspect of our experience that is considered the property responsible for the mystery of consciousness, the one feature that grounds the hard problem. In the meantime, as Zahavi and Kriegel (2105) have recognized, some philosophers maintain that for-me-ness is «a philosophical myth with no psychological reality» (p.1), something that lacks a proper positive description and has no explicative role (Dainton, 2016; Guillot, 2017; Howell & Thompson, 2017; Musholt, 2015). This suggests that we are faced with a problem: Does for-me-ness exist? If it exists, what is its nature? These and other related questions characterize what I call “the problem of for-me-ness.” This paper aims to clarify and describe the problem of for-me-ness by offering a taxonomy of the theories of the phenomenon at issue which combines the literature on phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Although discussions about for-me-ness have achieved great popularity, indeed, scant attention has been paid to clearly define the limits of the problem at issue and the theories which have been provided to explain its nature. Some recent works have partially tried to achieve this (cf. Farrell & McClelland, 2017; Guillot, 2017; Howell & Thompson, 2017), but they, in short, have questioned whether a real unified problem exists and have suggested different authors
mean different things by the same notion. While I agree that the debate is affected by ambiguous notions, I believe that this is due to a lack of recognition of what the problem concerns rather than a lack of a genuine problem.

Donnchadh O Conaill  
*Subjectivity and Non-Objectifying Awareness*

A long tradition holds that each subject is necessarily aware of her experiences as she has them (I term this the subject’s inner awareness). Inner awareness is often said to constitute the subjectivity of our experiences, their distinctively first-personal character (Levine 2001; Kriegel 2009). An important line of thought found in phenomenological thinkers such as Husserl and Sartre holds that inner awareness is non-objectifying: one’s experiences “are not given as objects; they are not something we observe from a distance and they do not stand opposite us” (Zahavi 2005, 64). The idea of non-objectifying awareness is often criticised as obscure. What is needed is a positive account of what is it for awareness to be non-objectifying. To provide such an account, I appeal to P.F. Strawson’s work on feature-placing statements (1959). These are statements where the distinction between universals and particulars does not apply, e.g., ‘Now it is snowing’ or ‘There is water here’. In contrast, a non-feature-placing statement such as ‘This is a cat’ involves a distinction between a universal term (‘cat’) and the particular instance picked out in the statement. I suggest that inner awareness is a feature-placing form of awareness: it does not involve a distinction between universals and particulars. In inner awareness one is aware of one’s experiences, which are particular events or episodes, but one is not aware of them as particulars. For example, the content of one’s inner awareness might be ‘Now it is painful’, as opposed to ‘This is an experience of pain’.

This allows us to understand how inner awareness can be non-objectifying. In inner awareness, one’s experiences are not presented as discrete bounded particulars, and so they do not appear to us in the way that objects of perception or thought usually do.

**Parallel session: Philosophy of Mind**

Alfredo Tomasetta  
*In the Mirror of Experience. How For-meness is Given*

Does phenomenal consciousness entail self-consciousness? In recent years a number of philosophers have given a positive answer to this question (e.g.: Montague, Kriegel, Strawson, Zahavi). The idea is that every experience comes with experience of that very experience: a conscious state is (essentially) self-conscious because in some way it involves consciousness of itself. Some – most notably Zahavi – have further claimed that self-consciousness involves not just experiencing the experience, but also a pre-reflexive, non-conceptual consciousness of the subject of experience: my experiences, for example, are experienced as experiences-given-to-me, and so they possess, and phenomenally manifest, for-me-ness. I agree. And yet how exactly does this happen? My talk offers a new model for understanding ‘Zahavian’ self-consciousness, a model according to which in having any experience E, one is aware of 1) the content presented by E, 2) E itself, 3) the givenness relation, and 4) the experiencing subject.

Anna Giustina  
*Knowledge by Acquaintance is a sui generis Kind of Knowledge*
The focus of this paper is knowledge by acquaintance, i.e. (roughly) knowledge we have of that which we are directly aware of. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis kind of knowledge: it is irreducible to propositional knowledge, as well as to other (putative) kinds of knowledge such as knowing-how and knowledge of a subject matter; nonetheless, it is fully-fledged knowledge. First, I spell out the notion of knowledge by acquaintance, partly by appeal to Bertrand Russell’s (1912) first characterization of it. I also illustrate what it means for knowledge by acquaintance to be sui generis, and what it takes for it to be irreducible to other kinds of knowledge. Secondly, I present some cases in which one intuitively seems to have some kind of knowledge which exceeds possession of propositional knowledge (or of any other putative kind of knowledge); on this basis I argue that there is prima facie reason to believe that knowledge by acquaintance is a sui generis fully-fledged kind of knowledge. Thirdly, I consider some objections to the claim that knowledge by acquaintance is sui generis: the objection from disunity (knowledge is a unified rather than scattered notion) and the objection from mysteriousness (the notion of knowledge by acquaintance is unintelligible unless reduced to some other kind of knowledge). I show that those objections can be rebutted. Finally, I show that knowledge by acquaintance as I characterize it is fully-fledged knowledge. I argue that knowledge by acquaintance provides the subject with information about the phenomenology of their current conscious experience, that such information acquisition is a cognitive achievement, and that such cognitive achievement is sufficient for fully-fledged knowledge. I conclude that knowledge by acquaintance being a sui generis kind of knowledge remains a live option on the table.
Ian Carter

Self-Ownership and the Importance of the Human Body

In this paper I attempt to vindicate the “asymmetry thesis”, according to which ownership of one's own body is intrinsically different from ownership of other objects, and the view that self-ownership, as libertarians normally understand the concept, enjoys a special “fact-insensitive” status as a fundamental right. In particular, I argue in favor of the following two claims. First, the right of self-ownership is most plausibly understood as based on the more fundamental notion of respect for persons, where the concept of a person is in turn understood, along the lines set out by P.F. Strawson and P.M.S. Hacker, as referring to an entire biological organism with a certain set of mental and corporeal characteristics. If we restrict our attention to human persons, we can say on this basis that there is a special moral status attaching to the entire human body, and to no more than the human body. Second, self-ownership is not, as critics have sometimes supposed, based on a more fundamental right to equal freedom or autonomy. Criticisms of self-ownership as insufficiently justified on the basis of such rights are therefore off target. Rather, equal freedom and self-ownership are each based directly on the more fundamental notion of respect for persons. For left-libertarians, the asymmetry thesis serves to give priority to self-ownership when delineating a set of original property rights, given that there are many alternative ways of realizing equal freedom not all of which involve fully respecting the right of self-ownership.

Giacomo Floris

On respect and moral (in)equality

Most liberal philosophers would agree that those beings that have the capacity for moral personality are moral equals. However, it is unclear how the possession of a scalar capacity can justify persons’ equal moral status. Ian Carter’s view (2011) provides a promising answer to this question: in short, Carter argues that the principle of moral equality is grounded in a duty of opacity respect for moral persons’ outward dignity to refrain from considering their level of agential capacities as relevant to the assessment of their moral status. In this paper, I argue that while we should follow Carter in maintaining that moral equality is ultimately grounded in a duty of opacity respect, we should resist his suggestion that treating persons as opaque is all that respect for the dignity of moral persons requires. Contra Carter, I contend that moral persons have also an inward dignity which grounds a duty of positive respect to remove the internal impairments that hinder their ability to exercise the capacity for moral personality. The paper concludes by pointing out two implications that a pluralist account of respect has with regards to the question of moral equality: first, there are some circumstances in which we must lift the opacity veil to fulfil our duty of positive respect; hence, not being considered as a moral equal might be a matter of (positive) respect. Second, even if a duty of positive respect is irreconcilable with considering a person as a moral equal, it may be compatible with treating her as such – some substantive equality may follow from some moral inequality. If I am right, having one’s dignity respected is morally more fundamental than being considered as a moral equal; hence, when the two come apart, the former should have priority over the former.

Giulio Fornaroli

Reasonable Consensus, Interpretive Disagreement and Legitimacy
Imagine citizens within a society have reached a consensus on which principles of justice ought to be part in that society’s public justification. Citizens agree that the principles the society appeals to in order to justify its authority are reasonable. Can political legitimacy ever depend on a consensus of this type? The presentation suggests adopting a sceptical stand towards this political liberal insight.

Unless the society is unusually homogeneous, the principles that compose the consensus are going to be significantly abstract and vague. Which means that, when they discuss whether a particular compliance-demanding norm coheres with the principles object of the consensus, citizens will engage in some kind of interpretive enterprise, generating its own interpretive disagreement. At the end of the debate, some citizens will presumably disagree not merely about the norm’s absolute desirability, but also about its reasonableness, i.e. coherence with the principles used as the basis of public justification. "In abstracto" consensus about the reasonableness of certain principle does not entail "in concreto" agreement about the reasonableness of all the judgements that can be justified appealing to the principles themselves.

If this is the case, the reconciliation between political legitimacy and disagreement is at risk. For an evaluation of legitimacy, pace political liberals, cannot purely depend on the abstract principles justifying a society’s authority, but must also incorporate some evaluation of the concrete norms citizens are ordinarily subjected to.

Political liberalism is hence forced into a dilemma. It can, on the one hand, reject my expanded account of legitimacy, thus giving up its usual representation as an ideal that pays particular respect to the phenomenon of disagreement. On the other, it can accept it, and thus concur that most existing states are, due to their forcing citizens to comply with norms they believe are unreasonable, illegitimate.

Michele Bocchiola
The Distinctiveness of Whistleblowing

In the contemporary debate, whistleblowing has often been described as the heroic attempt of an individual who acts on higher moral grounds. Following this standard view, philosophers have typically interpreted whistleblowing as supererogation—something good to do, but not morally required—because of the risks and costs it could impose on people. As a result, the promotion of whistleblowing policies on the basis of its efficacy in the fight against crimes and misdemeanors has become central in the debate, leaving more theoretical issues on the justification of a whistleblowing aside. Against the standard view, in this paper I try to show that whistleblowing could refer to a distinctive duty of a member of a legitimate organization to report wrongdoings.

The paper proceeds as follows. I start with a general characterization of whistleblowing and the related duty to report (§2). Then, I critically engage with some of the standard philosophical perspectives on whistleblowing—a consequentialist view (§3) and a deontological view (§4) respectively—, claiming that they fail to ground a distinctive duty to report because they collapse whistleblowing either into an application of the so-called harm principle—the view that one ought to prevent harm, if she can—or into professional ethics—the set of duties associated with the use of a specific body of knowledge. I shall then try to combine the relative strengths of the standard views (§5). On the view I defend here, one ought to blow the whistle even when the law, professional associations or organizational codes of conduct do not explicitly so require, and that such a duty captures the salient phenomenological features of whistleblowing, without falling into the realm of the supererogatory.

Alice Borghi and Guglielmo Feis
Is Beckman’s All-Affected Principle Really Affecting Everybody? For an Improved Formulation of a Legal-Oriented All-Affected Principle
Political philosophy spent a fair amount of times discussing what becomes known as the “all-affected principle”. The principle says that everyone who is affected by a collective decision should be included in the process through which this decision is made.

Here we focus on Beckman (2008)’s reconstruction of the “all-affected interests principle” as interpreted “in legal terms” that he opposes to a causal affectedness:

According to Beckman (2008), a legal-based interpretation has at least the following advantages over the rival causal account:

1) It does not suffer of indefinitiveness;
2) It is government-dependent;
3) It is contingent-independent.

We use Beckman’s points to show his understanding of legal-affectedness adopts an idea of jurisdiction that is oversimplified and does not take into account the difficulties of complex and merging legal systems (i.e. fragmentation in international law, conflicting legislations, transnational states, etc.).

A national-based idea of jurisdiction (as Beckman’s) is far from being precise. Should conflicts of legislation and jurisdiction arise we shall have no clue on how to operate. A government is not enough to request the implementation of a polity. Consider migrations cases, international sanction or data scattered across the internet.

Last but not least, a legal system is contingent by definition (unless you defend some theory of natural law). Hence the membership criteria, if defined piggybacking a legal system, cannot be contingent independent.

The upshot is a better formulation of a legal version of the all-affected principle that is suited to be applied in the legal domain.

Guglielmo Feis
Are in Concreto Antinomies Predictable? Unpacking a (missed) Debate

The paper investigates whether cases of in concreto antinomies (or indirect antinomies or accidental antinomies or normative conflicts due to the facts) can be predicted or not. I distinguish two main theoretical positions: “pro detection” (e.g. Pierluigi Chiassoni and David Martinez Zorrilla) argues that we can predict in concreto antinomies; “unpredictability” (e.g. Riccardo Guastini) argues that they cannot be predicted.

I will highlight the limits of both strategies showing how the debate is vitiated by our biases. I offer a procedure based on deontic logic to distinguish predictable and unpredictable normative conflicts. They are predictable if, after translating the case in the deontic logic, a conflictual relationship is triggered; unpredictable otherwise.

This leads to a dynamic view on the predictability arguing that after the first in concreto case we could not predict, the predictability of similar in concreto cases increases the more the cases keep repeating. The first occurrence of a truly in concreto antinomy has to be unpredictable, both by definition and given our knowledge of the world and legal situation. Given what we knew at the time, the occurrence of the in concreto case has “practically unpredictable”. I argue that, to retain unpredictability despite the fact that the in concreto case repeats itself, supporters of unpredictability need a commitment to a form of legal particularism. In such a way there will never be a repetition of an in concreto case that favours its predictability.
Giovanni Marco Martino
The Consistency of Impredicative BLV and Frege's Context Principle

The aim of this abstract is to present a theory based on Frege's infamous Basic Law V. As it is well known, BLV is inconsistent with full-impredicative second-order comprehension (CA). However, in recent years, several works have showed how it is possible to retain consistency: particularly, Jonne Kriener has investigated a link between the truth-theory inspired by Kripke, and class-theory. According to this, my purpose is to show how it is possible to retain the consistency of BLV using Kriener's approach to naive CA class theory. For the sake of consistency, I will provide my BLV-theory with Kripke's truth-predicate T(x) in order to determine which CA-instances are valid and which not. According to Kripke's construction, only those CA-instances that are in the fixed point of T(x) will be valid and then governed by BLV. A natural model for this construction will be based on Heck's model for the predicative fragments of BLV arranged by ranks and degrees on the complexity of formulas. Moreover, I will show how the consistency proof will be based on Kripke's Fixed Point construction.

Finally, I will analyse some benefits of my proposal. The resulting system is consistent and mathematically stronger then any predicative BLV-fragments. Furthermore, my goal will be to justify the former construction using one of the most crucial principles in Frege's philosophy, the Context Principle. To do this, I will show an almost perfect correspondence between Kripke's notion of extension and anti-extension of a truth-predicate and Frege's theory of extensions.

Alex Steinberg
Content in Frege's Grundlagen

In §64 of Grundlagen Frege famously suggests that we may acquire a new concept, in this case the concept of direction, by splitting up the content of an already understood sentence – ‘line a is parallel to line b’ – in a new way – corresponding to the sentence ‘the direction of line a is the same as the direction of line b’. A central question about the procedure of concept acquisition envisaged here is what the relevant notion of content is according to which the two sentences and similar sentence pairs can be seen as suggesting two different splittings up (or recarvings) of the same content. In the talk I will discuss and dismiss a recent proposal by Bob Hale, and suggest an alternative reconstruction of the relation of content-identity in play as sameness of ultimate non-factive grounds.

Silvia Bianchi
'Thin Objects' in the Scientific and Mathematical Structuralism: Ontological Dependence and Grounding for a Weak Approach

In the present discussion, my aim is to interpret Linnebo (2008) and Wigglesworth’s (2018) analyses of mathematical structuralism – focused on ontological dependence and grounding – in terms of what I shall define Weak Mathematical Structuralism(WMS): this position appears as a further version of ante rem structuralism which entails a twofold non-eliminative approach to both abstract structures and individual objects.

In analogy with the philosophy of science, mathematical objects will be presented as very peculiar thin entities which – lacking intrinsic properties – entirely depend on structures for their identity;
still, given that relations require relata, they exist as intelligible and possibly autonomous entities. This idea seems plausible because thin objects – in contrast to purely structural objects – possess both structural and non-structural/non-essential properties.

The comparison between mathematical structuralism and graph theory (Ladyman and Leitgeb, 2008; Wigglesworth, 2018) will help to grasp a specific example of thin objects in the mathematical practice as unlabelled and edgeless nodes in a graph.

WMS has the advantage of effectively tackling certain objections to the traditional non-eliminative structuralism: circularity in the individuation of objects and unclear or inconsistent individuation of structures.

Nevertheless, a defensible articulation of WMS – along with a plausible solution of the objections – requires that the introduction of thin objects does neither undermine the overall structuralist framework nor commit to an in re approach; indeed, as I will explain, thin objects should be consistent with an ante rem individuation of structures, in which no concrete system is needed. In this way, a modified version of non-eliminative structuralism allows to give more weight to individual objects without giving up the priority of abstract structures, that is the core intuition of the ante rem perspective.

Lorenzo Rossi and Carlo Nicolai  
*Grounded Reasoning and Core Grounding*

Recent years have seen a significant growth in the investigations of concepts of grounding, which have been employed in a wide range of areas -- from metaphysics, to formal semantics, to theories of truth. Roughly speaking, the general claim that A grounds B can be understood as the claim that B is or holds in virtue of A being the case or holding.

Notions of grounding have been recently subject to extended logical investigations, aimed at discovering and formulating the logics that govern such concepts. Yet, it is unclear whether simply providing a logic is appropriate to formulate the ground-theoretic talk. For one thing, if claims of the form "A grounds B" are modelled via a logical calculus, the ground-theoretic talk remains confined in the meta-language, and ground-theoretic claims cannot be made in the object-language. For another, several ground-theoretic claims are quantified statements, and simply cannot be accounted for if grounding is modelled as a meta-logical notion (e.g. "every arithmetical truth is grounded in arithmetical atomic truths"). Finally, ground-theoretic claims should also be self-applicable, for certain ground-theoretic claims arguably ground other ground-theoretic claims (e.g. ""0=0" grounds ""0=0" is true"" arguably grounds """"0=0" is true"" grounds """"0=0" is true"" is true"). For all these reasons, we argue, ground-theoretic statements should be modelled via a self-applicable predicate, applying to sentence names. This suggests deep connections between groundedness in general and the theories of self-applicable grounded truth that have been explored since the seminal work of Kripke (1975).

In this paper, we propose a model-theoretic semantics for a language containing a self-applicable grounding predicate, that enables us to validate desirable ground-theoretic claims -- including quantified statements -- and that avoids paradoxes and inconsistencies. We also construct adequate (if infinitary) calculi for our models, and discuss both classical and non-classical approaches to self-applicable grounding.

Lorenzo Azzano and Massimiliano Carrara  
*Explaining Identities*

Can identities be explained? An argument has been offered supporting a negative answer: given that identities are necessary, they cannot be grounded; furthermore, if they cannot be grounded, they cannot be explained either.
By arguing against two key premises of this argument, we argue, on the contrary, that identities can be explained. The individuation of a notion of explanation as a primarily epistemic or subject-relative relation will allow us to challenge this argument by providing two sets of examples of explanation of identities; viz. explanation via identity criteria and explanation via deduction. These cases can be either read as claiming that there is a way to argue that identities can be explained, or that identities can be explained but not grounded, thus rejecting either one of two key assumptions of the original argument.

In general, the discussion about the explainability of identities qua necessary facts bears overarching consequences in a very recent meta-ontological debate, viz. the debate around the link between grounding –as an objective and mind-independent relation–, and explanation –as an epistemic or otherwise subject-relative relation.

Andrea Sereni and Luca Zanetti
*Minimalism, Trivialism, and Conceptual Grounding*

Minimalism and Trivialism are two recent forms of ‘cheap’ Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. Minimalism (Linnebo 2009, 2012, 2018) is the view that mathematical objects are thin in the sense that their existence doesn’t demand very much from the world. Trivialism (Rayo 2013, 2016) is the view that arithmetical statements have trivial truth-conditions. In this paper we claim that a notion of ‘conceptual’ grounding can be tailored to suits the needs of both Minimalism and Trivialism; we consider objections from both parts, and we argue that conceptual grounding emerges as a middle ground between these two positions.

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Chiara Brozzo

*A Minimal Hierarchical Theory of Bodily Action*

How many kinds of intention are needed to account for planning and performing bodily actions? A standard response, given by so-called dual theories, is two kinds: intentions for the future (also called prior intentions or distal intentions) and intentions for the present (also called intentions in action or proximal intentions). I introduce a novel alternative account of planning and performing bodily actions: the hierarchical theory. According to it, the two kinds of intention contemplated by dual theories should be integrated into, or else replaced by, just one kind of intention. The hierarchical theory is motivated by a dilemma that dual theories face about intentions for the present. According to the first horn, intentions for the present have functional and content-related features that, on closer inspection, intentions for the future turn out to already have. According to the second horn, intentions for the present have functional features that only states that are not intentions—e.g., motor representations—can have. Neither horn of the dilemma justifies introducing intentions for the present: the first renders them superfluous, while the second only justifies introducing states that are not intentions. The hierarchical theory is so named because it features several token intentions of the same kind, which are hierarchically ordered on the basis of the means-end relations holding among the represented states of affairs. It is minimal because intentions of just one kind do all the work for which our best current causal theories of action require two kinds of intention.

Matteo Bianchin

*Social Cognition, Cooperation, and Hypothetical Contracts*

Social contract theory traditionally faces three objections: that hypothetical contracts are not binding; that they model actors according to an unrealistically abstract conception of self and agency; that the theory is circular. I contend that current work in social cognition provides the tools to cope with the second and the third worry, and to deal with the first. I draw on Tomasello’s work on the psychological infrastructure of cooperation and on Goldman’s simulation theory to figure out the mechanisms at work, and argue that they provide agents with a framework for handling hypothetical contracts, grasping their normative content, supporting the motivation to comply. I frame the issue in the context of Rawls’s’s understanding of the original position as designed to convert a question of justification into a deliberative problem. Drawing on Tomasello’s work I take that (a) cooperative activities require understanding the equivalence between self and other, hence a capacity for social cognition that supports perspective taking and role reversal, and (b) the pro-social motives stemming from early inclinations to help and share develop through social interaction into a disposition to reciprocity. I further maintain that social cognition is supported by simulative mindreading and rest on a single mechanism of imaginative self-projection that works both in intrapersonal action planning and in interpersonal cooperation. I argue that deliberating in the original position results from recruiting a suitably abstract conception of agency under the self-other equivalence that goes along with early joint actions. This can be expected to occur as a representational theory of mind is acquired and social cognition consequently rearranges, enabling agents to generalize the conditions under which joint actions are performed and to cooperate in anonymous settings. A related shift in the disposition to reciprocate is likely to take place, yielding a general system of normative expectations about fairness.
Camil Golub  
*Making Peace with Moral Imperfection: the Problem of Temporal Asymmetry*

How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not properly resolve the problem of temporal asymmetry in our attitudes toward moral imperfection, and I defend an alternative response, centered on our personal attachments and our biographical identity.

Giovanni Tuzet  
*Epistemic and Practical Concerns: When You Can't Meet Both. The case of FRE 407*

It is not uncommon in our experience that epistemic and practical interests conflict. It often happens that it is not possible to pursue the ones and the others at the same time to the same extent; then we must make a trade-off decision. This also occurs in institutional settings such as the legal one. I take the example of a US evidence rule (Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence) that sacrifices some epistemic interests in favor of practical ones. It is the rule on “Subsequent Remedial Measures”, which is mainly designed to reduce accidents, because it says that evidence of remedial measures taken after an accident is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product or its design, or a need for a warning or instruction.

The rule is understood to answer a practical concern (reducing accidents) instead of the epistemic one of getting some evidence to find out whether the defendant was negligent, or whether his or her conduct was culpable, etc. But some commentators and courts think that the rationale of the rule is more complex and deserves a more careful discussion, as I will try to show. I will also discuss the philosophical consequences that are to be drawn from a rule like this, which I finally assess in the perspective of philosophical pragmatism.

Federico Lauria  
*What Is Emotion’s Role in Self-Deception? The Affective Filter View in Aid of Non-Intentionalism*

Emotion plays a constitutive role in the dynamic of self-deception (“emotionalism”). Intuitively, we deceive ourselves to avoid distress, and emotions such as anxiety drive self-deception. Despite its importance, the affective dynamic of self-deception has been neglected. However, scrutinizing it matters. Emotionalists argue that their view favors non-intentionalism regarding self-deception and that it offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. Does emotionalism fulfill its promises of non-intentionalism and unity?

This talk tackles this issue. It offers a critical exploration of various emotionalist accounts, such as the claims that self-deception has the function of reducing anxiety or is motivated by anxiety. In light of this examination, we argue for the affective filter view: self-deception involves affective filters of information, that is, evaluation of information in light of one’s concerns. More precisely, self-deception involves appraising the “distressing evidence/situation” as uncertain, as negative for one’s well-being, and as falling beyond one’s control. Conversely, the “happy evidence/situation” is appraised in a positive manner. At the neurobiological level, the mechanisms of somatic markers and dopamine regulation account for the selective treatment of information. We justify this conception with the help of recent neuroscientific findings on affective biases. We argue that our conception clearly favors non-intentionalism and offers a unified account of straight and twisted self-deception. We do not need intention to understand self-deception’s dynamic; emotions are
sufficient if we clarify the neurobiological mechanisms at hand. The promises of emotionalism are thus kept. It was time that philosophers paid more attention to the affective dynamic of self-deception and used the insights of affective neuroscience into this issue.

Marie van Loon

Making the Lie Stick: Possessing Evidence in Self-Deception

In this paper, 'Making the Lie Stick: Possessing Evidence in Self-Deception', submitted for the symposium on motivated belief, I argue that self-deceived subjects are in touch with evidence for their beliefs. More precisely, self-deceived subjects stand in a relation to evidence which philosophers have called “possession of evidence” (Schroeder 2011, Schmidt 2018). Although possessing evidence requires that the subject have representational attitudes towards evidence, they do not require that these attitudes be justified. I show that self-deceived subjects fulfil the conditions required by this view. I defend this claim with the two following ideas: 1) self-deceptive beliefs are nothing but a lie one tells oneself; and, for a lie to be believed, it must come under the guise of a reasonable proposition, i.e. a proposition which is epistemically “sticky”, by presenting evidence to the subject such that she forms a belief grounded in this evidence; and 2) self-deceptive beliefs involve manipulating the evidence (Mele 1997, 2001, 2006, 2011) in a way that fits the subject’s desire, and manipulation of the evidence requires that the subject has presentational attitudes towards evidence.

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Marco Arienti  
*Experientialism about Depiction and Pictorial Recognition. Taking the Experience/Representation Gap Seriously*

A family of theories, sharing an approach named by Hopkins (1998) as experientialism, holds that depictive representations should be defined in terms of some kind of visual experience elicited in the viewers. Their aim is to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of depiction to accommodate not only the experiential effect, but also the representational value of pictures. They thus claim that pictorial experience must conform to a standard of correctness, which states what has to be appropriately recognized as the represented subject. However, since the link between the depictive content and the standard of correctness is not itself visible in the picture, questions arise about how the recognition of that determinate subject can be carried out by visual experience. A common reply by experientialism is that such recognition is guided by further background information pertaining the standard and affecting our seeing.

I argue that this issue about pictorial recognition brings to light the problem of experientialism with clarifying how pictures represent a subject in a visual way. The reason is that the suggested view overlooks the gap between the notions of pictorial experience and pictorial representation. In fact, even if we suppose that some relevant features of that experience can connect with suitable pieces of background information, it can be shown that the former alone is not able to put constraints on the latter in order to reach the recognition of the depicted subject. As a result, the proposal runs into a circularity, since it is not clear how the necessary information can become salient for our experience unless what is represented has already been grasped. This failure in accounting for how the standard of correctness applies to pictorial recognition casts doubt on the explanation of the representational function of pictures offered by experientialism.

Gabriele Ferretti  
*Why the Pictorial Needs the Motoric*

Does action play any crucial role in our perception of pictures? The standard literature on picture perception has never explicitly tackled this question. This is for a simple reason. After all, objects in a picture seem to be static objects of perception: we cannot act upon them (Matthen 2005; Nanay 2011; Ferretti 2016a, 2016b, 2017, forthcoming) and we cannot perceive significant spatial shifts as we move with respect to them (Nanay 2010, 2011; Hopkins 2012). Thus, it might sound extremely controversial to say that action is crucial in picture perception.

Contrary to this general stance, this paper defends, for the first time, this apparently very controversial claim, never addressed in the literature: that the specific and crucial relations between vision and action make action crucial in order for us to enter pictorial experience.

I first motivate the rationale of the paper by addressing two ideas about perception that are now widely accepted by philosophers, but, nonetheless, have never been coupled together before:

1. Pictorial representations are perceptual.
2. Perception is inextricably linked to action.

Taken together, they seem to suggest that:

3. Pictorial representations are inextricably linked to action.
Then, I discuss two ways in which vision and action are crucially linked, by describing the famous notions of Vision-for-Action and Sensorimotor Understanding. At this point, I defend (3) by developing the brand-new claim that Vision-for-Action and Sensorimotor Understanding play a pivotal role in allowing us to enter pictorial experience. Indeed, when we cannot rely on them, there is a breakdown of pictorial experience, of the kind obtained with trompe l’oeil illusions. In other words, I will show that, in a slogan: ‘the pictorial needs the motoric’. This will allow me to develop the first Action-Based Theory of Picture Perception.

Bianca Cepollaro

_Isn’t it fun? An investigation on Taste and Morality_

In this paper I investigate the relation between morality and taste, understood as the disposition to like or enjoy something, from food to activities: in particular, I am interested in the ways in which moral issues can modify our experience of something being fun or funny. It is usually assumed that people do not need to coordinate on matters of taste (de gustibus non est disputandum): predicates of personal taste strictly depend on the subject’s experiential state and they can give rise to faultless disagreement. On the other hand, it is assumed that morality requires coordination and is not solely ground in our experiential states, as it concerns the ways in which we organize our societies, the principles on which we build our community life. In support of such a divide, Stojanovic 2017 remarks that moral and taste predicates display different linguistic behavior and the corresponding disagreements are distinct in relevant respects. Despite the fact that our need to coordinate on taste is usually mild compared to the case of morality, in this paper I claim that there are scenarios where matters of taste do in fact involve moral issues on which we need to coordinate. To this end, I consider two predicates of personal taste, ‘fun’ and ‘funny’ and show how the disagreement about whether something is ‘fun’ or ‘funny’ involves moral considerations and asks for coordination. In such cases, the interplay between morality and amusement affects the ways in which the relevant predicates are used. Overall, this work investigates further the relation between the moral and the taste dimensions and challenges the rigid conception of the divide between the two.


Andrea Borghini and Nicola Piras

_Metaphysics of Food: Phases, Deaths, and Miracles_

Death is a rich and complex concept, predicated of lots of entities, beginning with organisms. In this paper we aim to take somewhat seriously the idea that foods ‘die,’ i.e. to study the obvious fact that, at some point or other, every food is doomed to cease to exist qua food (though it may continue to exist as something else). Our analysis will be a metaphysical one. Central to our inquiry is what we shall term the Duration Question (DQ): When is it that x ceases to exist? Such a question is not to be confused with the following, well-known Persistence Question: What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions in order for a past or future thing to be identical with a present one? Although food ontologies have been explored in some details by formal ontologists, no food ontology has so far modeled foods vis a vis DQ. Our analysis of DQ is divided into three types of cases. (i) Phase. When a food’s life is saved, but the food is transformed, thus beginning a new phase of its life. (ii) Death. When a food ceases to exist simpliciter, i.e. when it dies. (iii) Miracles. When a food can survive so to speak miraculously, that is, thanks to some ‘unnatural’ maneuvers. The paper carries forward a metaphysical analysis of
phases, deaths, and miracles of foods, with a chief goal in sight: to provide a comprehensive and systematic picture of all the different ways a food can ‘die;’ such picture would play an important contribution to a systematic theoretical framework for food identity. Such framework is in need by food scholars as well as in legal, economic, and public debates about food; and metaphysicians are especially well positioned to deliver it.

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Matteo Plebani and Giuseppe Spolaore  
*Subject Matter: a Modest Proposal*

We present an account of subject matter (SM) inspired by David Lewis’ work. Our account shares the attractive features of Lewis’ original account, but it has also a number of advantages. In particular, our framework provides a fine-grained account of sentential SM, which is missing from Lewis proposal.

Fabrizio Calzavarini  
*Model-theoretic Semantics and Semantic Competence*

In contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, it is generally assumed that model-theoretic semantics for natural language [MTS-NL] can also provide an explanatory account of meaning as a cognitive phenomenon (i.e. semantic competence). Such a cognitivist view is the natural extension of the Chomskian approach to syntax, and has been explicitly endorsed in many introductory textbooks for both Montagovian and Davidsonian MTS-NL. In this talk, I will argue that the association of cognitivism and MTS-NL is controversial. The recursive components of MTS-NL could have some empirical import in the study of the compositional aspects of semantic competence. However, MTS-NL is only partially adequate to deal with the lexical aspects of human semantic competence. In philosophy of language, a distinction has been proposed between two aspects of lexical competence (Marconi 1997). The first aspect, i.e. inferential competence, is the ability to deal with the network of semantic relations among lexical units of a natural language, underlying such performances as semantic inference, paraphrase, definition, retrieval of a word from its definition, finding a synonym, and so forth. In MTS-NL, this aspect of lexical competence can be easily modelled by means of Carnapian meaning postulates, i.e. universally quantified (bi)conditional statements that constrain the extensions of the constant that appear in them. The second aspect of lexical competence, i.e. referential competence, concerns the mapping between words and objects, events and circumstances in the world. Critically, the referential aspect of lexical competence is problematic for MTS-NL: no amount of meaning postulates is going to explicate this ability. It is possible to think that the problem could be simply solved by integrating MTS-NL with an adequate account of an ordinary speaker’s referential competence. However, it seems that a deep philosophical problem affects any attempt to provide an integration of this sort for MTS-NL.

Paolo Labinaz  
*Assertion, Pattern Recognition and Epistemic Vigilance*

This paper addresses the question of how assertion actually supports reliable information transmission. On the one hand, assertion most certainly lies at the core of those social processes which regard the circulation of information and knowledge. On the other, the exchange and sharing of information and knowledge is a highly complex affair, which requires (at the very least) trust and vigilance. More specifically, as Dan Sperber and colleagues have suggested recently (2010), being able to trust and rely upon our interlocutors in the course of communication depends on “a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance”.
My aim here is to explore the role that assertion may play in relation to the monitoring activity carried out by these “epistemic vigilance mechanisms”, examining the relationship between the requirements posed by those mechanisms and the felicity conditions proper to assertion. To do so, I shall be using an Austin-based speech-act theoretical framework (Austin 1975; Sbisà in press), according to which every type of illocutionary act is associated with a socially accepted procedure, which can be conceived as a script or a pattern comprising a certain kind of linguistic utterance, and designed to produce its characteristic conventional effect. In the case of assertion, this effect can be described as consisting of the production and transfer of knowledge. As I will try to show, while on the one hand, invoking the procedure for asserting really is for a speaker an effective, inexpensive way to overcome the monitoring activity carried out by the epistemic vigilance mechanisms of her audience, at the same time, this procedure must be handled with great care. Indeed, contrary to appearances, assertion is costly to perform, due to the risk of the speaker’s losing credibility if she should be discovered not to be in the epistemic position required by its procedure.

Alba Moreno Zurita

*It's not you, it's your social status: a structural approach to discursive injustice*

The aim of this paper is to defend that cases of interpretative injustice are not genuine cases of injustice and, therefore, there is no reason to maintain this notion. There are two reasons why we are maintaining this. First, as Fricker points out, for a situation to be a case of injustice, it must be persistent and systematic. However, Peet’s example seems to be a case of misunderstanding. Secondly, in the intervention for the case proposed by Peet, it might be enough to disambiguate, on the part of the speaker, the terms he has uttered. But, in cases of discursive and speech injustice, this type of intervention would have no effect whatsoever. Therefore this could suppose a problem for the notion of interpretative injustice.

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Stefano Leardi  
*Testimony, Memory, and Epistemic Variantism*

Knowledge can be transmitted from person to person, through testimony, and from one to one’s former self, through memory. Epistemic contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI), though, seem unable to endorse two very plausible principles, namely Transmission and Preservation, that account, respectively, for the transmission of knowledge through testimony and memory. I will present two examples that are supposed to show that contextualism and SSI are incompatible with the above-mentioned principles: according to the first, if conjoined with Transmission, contextualism and SSI would entail, counter-intuitively, that one can acquire high-stakes knowledge through the testimony of a person subject to a suitable low epistemic standard; according to the second, if conjoined with Preservation, the two theories would entail, again counter-intuitively, that one can acquire high-stakes knowledge on the basis of his previously acquired low-stakes knowledge. One strategy to solve this problem consists in pointing out that what is transmitted in the examples is not high-stakes knowledge, but low-stakes knowledge. Since I will maintain that this solution cannot be endorsed by contextualism and SSI, I will present another strategy according to which the principles should be reformulated to prevent the counterintuitive results. The new constraint introduced with the reformulated versions of the principles, however, raises two worries: the constraint might not be in consonance with our epistemic practice and it seems to saddle the recipient with the difficult task of evaluating whether the speaker - or his former self - is in the position to transmit knowledge. I will claim that the constraint is perfectly in line with our epistemic custom and that we generally prove to have the resources to achieve what is taken to be a too difficult epistemic task. Finally, I will consider how contextualism and SSI may accommodate in their theoretical frameworks the constraint introduced with the reformulated principles.

Lina Lissia  
*A Challenge to (Epistemic) Modus Ponens (and more)*

You are sitting in a restaurant with your Italian friend Pasquale. You know that Pasquale always orders one of the day’s specials. Today’s specials are pizza, pasta and roast beef. You know that Pasquale loves both pizza and pasta, and that he does not like roast beef very much. You estimate that there is a 40% probability that Pasquale will have pizza, a 40% probability that he will have pasta and a 20% probability that he will have roast beef.

In this context you believe both (1) “If Pasquale doesn’t have pizza, then he will have pasta” and (2) “Pasquale won’t have pizza”. Indeed, “Pasquale will have pizza” only has a probability of 40%. Now, from (1) and (2), using modus ponens, you should infer (3) “Pasquale will have pasta”. But (3) only has a probability of 40%! So you do not accept (3), that is, modus ponens fails. More specifically, “epistemic” modus ponens fails, i.e. we have a counterexample to the principle according to which if someone believes “if P then Q”, and he believes “P”, then he should believe “Q”.

It is easy to show that epistemic modus tollens is also invalid in the above scenario. Furthermore, readers can check that if we assume the material conditional both principles still fail. Interestingly, it can be shown that the failure of modus ponens and modus tollens does not depend on this specific scenario. Indeed, I demonstrate that even if we assume a very high threshold for belief (much higher than 0.6, which is the threshold implicitly assumed in the restaurant scenario), it
is still possible to have modus ponens and modus tollens generate a contradiction. I conclude by discussing some implications for the lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961).

Kim Phillips Pedersen
Testimonial Minimalism

This paper proposes a novel account of testimonial justification. I call the account Testimonial Minimalism (TM). It claims that (i) testimonial justification can be explained in terms of other kinds of justification (perceptual, inferential and memorial), and that (ii) all that is required for testimonial justification to believe P is that one has a justified belief that the speaker said that P (along with requirements on ordinary inferential justification). TM’s endorsement of (i) makes it a reductionist position: since explaining testimonial justification doesn’t require appeal to anything particular to testimony (e.g. epistemic principles governing testimony), testimonial justification is reduced. TM’s endorsement of (ii) makes it a credulist position: it does not require hearers to possess positive reasons – reasons independent of the fact that the speaker said that P – in order to be justified in believing that P on the basis of testimony to P.

Guido Tana
Epistemological Dogmatism and the Problem of the Criterion

In this presentation I offer a critique of epistemological Dogmatism and its anti-sceptical credentials, by investigating its handling of the sceptical Problem of the Criterion. Dogmatism is the neo-Moorean position which holds that we have prima facie defeasible justification due to the phenomenological presentation of ordinary perceptual experience. While dogmatism is usually considered as engaging scepticism mainly on the terrain of the external-world problem, arguing that the sceptical scenario is an eminently unreasonable one, I will claim that the dialectical exchange on this Cartesian issue is fundamentally uninformative, and dogmatism’s proposal actually bears on whether we can redeem our claims to have perceptual warrant in general. On this sceptical level a different threat arises from the Basic Knowledge/Easy Knowledge objection proposed by Cohen, which raises a question about how perceptual justification is achieved. Dogmatism allows for basic perceptual knowledge in order to answer the so-called Problem of the Criterion and its justificatory scepticism. However, the way Dogmatism sidesteps this problem leads it within the grip of the Agrippan modes of disagreement, hypothesis, reciprocity and regress, following the classic Pyrrhonian dialectic. Dogmatism is committed to fall within the mode of hypothesis to defend its claim of basic perceptual justification in the face of rational disagreement about sources of justification. This allows for generation of knowledge in an arbitrarily easy way. The arbitrariness of Easy Knowledge leads to the related Cognitive Penetration objection devised by Siegel and Markie. The methodology acquired by choosing an arbitrary criterion for justification commits Dogmatism to a vicious circularity, the Agrippan mode of reciprocity, leading to the collapse of dogmatism as a plausible theory of perceptual justification. Replies from the stands of dogmatism are ultimately not able to either preserve its naturalness, or to tackle the Problem of the Criterion in a satisfactory way.

Victoria Lavorerio
The Foundationalist Model of Deep Disagreements

The study of disagreements is currently one of the most prominent topics in epistemology. A particular kind of intractable disagreement, which following Fogelin (1985) I call ‘deep disagreement’, is gaining more and more attention. Deep disagreements are polemic, long-standing,
and particularly stubborn to adjudicate. Their persistence, however, is not to be explained by parties’ being pigheaded or trapped in biases. There is something about the epistemic situation of the disputants that makes deep disagreements intractable. In this presentation, I am interested in evaluating theories of deep disagreements. Thus, I present three desiderata I believe any theory of deep disagreements should be able to meet. After that, I introduce what I take to be the most prevalent kind of views of deep disagreements in epistemology, the Foundationalist Model. Regardless of their many differences, all the views included in this group conceptualize deep disagreements in a similar fashion: as differences in fundamental epistemic resources. By analyzing whether the Foundationalist Model meets the desiderata presented in the first section, I point to certain challenges a theory based in epistemic fundamental differences faces. My goal is modest; I want to draw a rudimentary metaepistemological landscape, in which theories of deep disagreements can be evaluated. Furthermore, I want to point to some shortcomings of views based on fundamental differences, in order to motivate a moderate skepticism towards such a model.

Elena Tassoni
Domain-Specific Logical Pluralism and the Case-Fixing Challenge

Logical pluralism is, roughly, the thesis that there is more than one true logic. The most discussed version of logical pluralism is the account endorsed by Beall and Restall (2000; 2001; 2006). Beall and Restall claim that the relation of logical consequence is underdetermined, and can be precisified in different ways, thus admitting for different equally legitimate logics. Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism is, in Haack’s (1978) words, a form of global pluralism; that is, the different logics apply across all truth-apt discourse. In recent years, a variant of Beall and Restall’s pluralism has been suggested; namely Domain-Specific Pluralism (Lynch 2009) – for short, DLP. DLP is a variant of Ball and Restall’s Pluralism in which the different admissible precisifications of validity apply only locally, in different domains of discourse. The different domains of discourse are identified, roughly, with different subject matter.

In this talk, I consider a novel objection to DLP, which I call the case-fixing challenge. In a nutshell, the problem is that, if DLP is true, there is a certain kind of arguments whose validity cannot be assessed. After presenting the case-fixing challenge, I compare it with both the objection of mixed inferences to truth pluralism (Tappolet 1997) and with the collapse objection to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism (Priest 2006). I argue that, although these three objections are all caused by similar phenomena, the case-fixing challenge differs from both the collapse problem and the objection of mixed inferences, and it is the most serious among the three.

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- September the 6th -
morning
It is widely believed that intentionality, or representational mental content, should be explained by giving some description of intentional mental phenomena in non-intentional terms (for example, in terms of causation or natural selection or some other natural relation) and that declining to offer such an explanation amounts to an appeal to ‘magic’ (as Hillary Putnam put it). It is also frequently assumed that this requirement is thought to be a quite general one — that is, one which is independent of other metaphysical views you may hold (for example, physicalism). In this talk I argue that there is no obvious general requirement to explain mental content in non-intentional terms, and I offer an alternative, more realistic, way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the natural world.
My aim in this paper is to argue for the claim that content externalism is compatible with a satisfactory account of the thinker’s rationality. The main distinctive feature of my compatibilist proposal concerns the role that in my view the phenomenology of occurrent thinking episodes plays in accounting for their (epistemic) transparency.

I shall present my compatibilist account in contraposition with Stalnaker’s (2008) proposal. According to Stalnaker it is only by adopting a thoroughly externalist account both of knowledge and of the role of content in the characterization of states of mind, an account that completely gets rid of any Cartesian residue, that “we can give a plausible account of what a subject knows and what he does not know about what he is thinking” (115).

Contra Stalnaker’s proposal I shall claim that no third-person (attributor/context/circumstance dependent) account of the subject’s cognitive perspective is ultimately able to provide an adequate explanation of the subject’s rationality. What is needed to that end is, in my view, an even more Cartesian picture of the mind than the one endorsed by what Boghossian calls the “Common View”, one that strictly connects mind and (phenomenal) consciousness.

What turns out to be transparent within my picture is not sameness and difference of mental contents, but rather sameness and difference of the ways in which our occurrent mental states are (phenomenally) presented to us, i.e. their (phenomenal) manners of presentation. Manners of presentation, while playing an individuative role as regards a subject’s occurrent mental states do not enter into the contents of the states. As a consequence, an internalistic individuation of manners of presentation is compatible with an externalistic individuation of the contents of mental states.

Katalin Farkas (keynote)
Closing the Explanatory Gap

Even when philosophers accept that physiological process underlie or constitute our conscious experiences, they often hold that there is a gap between bodily and mental processes: we cannot explain why a particular experience is connected to a particular bodily process. I will trace the origin of this idea to Descartes and Locke’s account of secondary qualities, and I will argue that contrary to what Descartes, Locke and many contemporary philosophers believe, the gap can be closed, or at least significantly narrowed.

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Enrico Biale  
*Partisan Paradox*

Democracy is a form of government that aims at making collective decisions through a set of procedures that includes on an equal footing every member of the polity so that they have control on the decision-making process. Deliberative procedures ensure inclusion and control by granting that political choices are the outcomes of a discursive process that members of the polity can understand, evaluate, and challenge. Despite its appeal, deliberative democracy has been traditional challenged because it requires that citizens impartially assess their claims and achieve a consensus. Recent accounts of deliberative democracy overcomes these objections by claiming that deliberation is compatible with partisanship and aims at compromise. Yet the relationship between partisanship and compromise is problematic. Some scholars held that partisans have principled reasons to compromise because they need to reciprocally acknowledge the partiality of their proposals and find a mediation between them. Yet other scholars suggested that partisans might have pragmatic, but not principled, reasons to compromise because a compromise with their counterparts might undermine their integrity. To conclude, while the desire to achieve political results incentivizes partisan to compromise integrity limits their disposition to pursue this aim. This is the partisan paradox that this paper will address so as to understand if a democratic process in which partisans are involved justifies compromise or not and if partisanship provides pragmatic or principled reasons to compromise. My analysis will show that inter-partisans interactions do not necessarily aim at compromise, but they can achieve this outcome and that there are principled reasons to justify it, provided that some normative constraints (intellectual honesty and loyal opposition) are met. This proposal will differ from those who argue that partisanship is fully compatible with compromise and those who challenge this idea by suggesting that partisans can have only pragmatic reasons to achieve this aim.

Federico Zuolo  
*Beyond Moral Efficiency. Effective Altruism and Theorizing about Effectiveness*

In this paper I provide a conceptual analysis of an underexplored issue in the debate about effective altruism: its theory of effectiveness. First, I distinguish effectiveness from efficiency and claim that effective altruism understands effectiveness through the lens of efficiency. Then, I discuss the limitations of this approach in particular with respect to the charge that it is incapable of supporting structural change. Finally, I propose an expansion of the notion of effectiveness of effective altruism by referring to the debate in political philosophy about realism and the practical challenge of normative theories. I argue that effective altruism, both as a social movement and as a conceptual paradigm, would benefit from clarifying its ideal, taking into account the role of institutions, and expanding its idea of feasibility.

Laura Valentini (keynote)  
*On Public Identity Disempowerment*

It is well known that social disempowerment can result from the ascription of certain identities, such as gender, race, ethnic, or religious identities. In this paper, I put the spotlight on a related, but different form of disempowerment, which affects the processes leading to the ascription of
those identities. This is the disempowerment suffered by those who are deprived of adequate control over how they are publicly perceived. I call it *public-identity disempowerment*. I offer a general framework for analysing this type of disempowerment, and discuss a particularly significant instance of it: *transparency-appraisal disempowerment*. I explain why transparency-appraisal disempowerment is wrongful, and show that it lies at the heart of otherwise rather different social phenomena, including bullying, cultural exclusion, statistical discrimination, and positive as well as negative stereotyping.

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The problem of future contingents is one of the most ancient and debated puzzles in Western philosophy. Aristotle’s chap. IX of De Interpretatione and Diodorus’ famous Master Argument are the first loci where the problem is analyzed. Several solutions have been formulated and Supervaluationism is, today, one of the most prominent formal solutions to the problem. In two famous papers, John MacFarlane has carried a well-known criticism to Supervaluationism (and all other standard approaches to future contingents) and put forward a new solution of the problem of future contingents, which is known as Double Time Reference Theory (DTRT). MacFarlane convincingly argues that an adequate theory of future contingents should save both the indeterminacy intuition (future contingent statements are neither true nor false when uttered) and the determinacy intuition (future contingent statements have a determinate truth value when assessed ex post). According to MacFarlane, Supervaluationism would not be able to do so, while DTRT allows for retaining both intuitions. Here, we show that this is only due to the limited expressivity of the modal language adopted, and when we opt for a reasonable enrichment of the language, the differences become immaterial. Along the same lines we show that Supervaluationism has no crucial problem with actuality operators, contrary to what MacFarlane (2008) claims. MacFarlane’s criticism to previous approaches to future contingents and his claim for the need of a new theory of future contingents are extremely influential today. If our considerations are right, however, they have much less punch than they are usually supposed to have.

This paper is about time and logicality. There is a long-standing debate, in logic, about logical notions: there are notions that are logical, like conjunction and implication, and others that are not, like “being human” or “Rome”. Tarski’s proposal is that logicality can be captured by invariance under some arbitrary transformations of objects of the universe. This paper will be focused on temporal notions: which temporal notion, if any, is logical? The first part of the paper will show how to extend standard invariance criterions for logicality to these notions, by looking at transformations of times (and not just of objects). In particular, I will show what tense operators come out logical, under this extended conception of invariance. The second part of the paper will be focused on MacFarlane’s argument against the invariance test: for him, the test is too exclusive, since operators sensitive to the ordering of times are logical, as well (MacFarlane, 2000). The third section will defend the plausibility of the results of the first section, against contentions like MacFarlane’s. I will show how any theory like MacFarlane’s will make the set of logical truths hostage to some physical/metaphysical aspects of time, like its density, infinity or linearity. To make my point, I will analyse different interpretations of logical consequence, and show how under any of them, MacFarlane’s theory over-generates logical truths. This is not acceptable, if one wants to keep logic “topic-neutral” (as one should, so I argue).

Some philosophers argue that consciousness is confined to a momentary interval: that we never
experience change, movement, succession; others think that consciousness is in fact momentary, but we are nevertheless directly aware of such features; others, finally, claim that consciousness is itself extended in time: that even if technically 'the present' is a point on the time line, 'our present' – the phenomenological one – is extended: a Specious Present, a time duration – psychological or objective – in which our perceptions are 'felt-as-present', with the typical immediacy associated. But what is the Specious Present? Which is its duration? And why, ultimately, do we need it to figure in our phenomenological account of temporal perception? In this paper, after introducing the role of the Specious Present in the main models that account for our phenomenological present, and after considering the very reasonable deflationary objection by Dennet (that the debate relies on the fallacy of the 'Cartesian Theatre of Mind': the idea that it is meaningful to ask where and when an experience becomes conscious), I claim – thanks to a spatial analogy – that there could be a good criterion to distinguish between a present experience and a past experience, that there are good reasons to sustain the 'Specious Present' view (while 'snapshots' are in no sense part of our phenomenological life), and that there could be a precise way to define the nature – and to measure the duration – of the Specious Present; as I will clarify, our capability and possibility to act and react are central in this perspective.

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Elisa Paganini  
*Fictional Content*

It is generally taken for granted that fictional assertions have a truth value. For example, the fictional assertion “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” is considered to be true, while the fictional assertion “Sherlock Holmes is a carpenter” is considered to be false. The difference between true and false fictional assertions is regarded to be the only reasonable explanation of correct and incorrect attitudes towards fictional content. For example, if John believes that Sherlock Holmes is a carpenter, he has an inadequate belief and the inadequacy seems to be explained in terms of the falsity of the content believed. On the other hand, if Mary believes that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, she has an adequate belief and the adequacy is explained in terms of the truth of the content believed.

My proposal is to characterize the adequacy or the inadequacy of the belief attitudes towards fictional content without assuming that fictional assertions have a truth value (or truth conditions). First of all, an explanation will be given of what it is for a fictional text to have a non-truth-conditional content: it will be argued that what allows a fictional text to have a content is not something that makes it true but the common disposition of the author and receivers of it to acknowledge possible situations as adequately or inadequately described by the text. The content is therefore described in terms of people’s dispositions and not in terms of conditions to be satisfied because of the interaction between the use of language and the world. Once the content is so characterized, the adequacy or the inadequacy of a disposition-like belief will be dictated only by the ability to use a language as other people do.

Giorgio Lando  
*Uniform Concretism for Linguistic Types*

According to concretism (the metaphysics of words inspired by Kaplan and later endorsed by Sainsbury), word types are temporally persistent, concrete entities. They are created at a certain time, and then intentionally repeated or stored in memory or in an external support. Word types are individuated by their origin, and not by their form or function. By contrast, sentence types are abstract entities, which exist also if and when nobody utters them, in force of the syntactic rules that make them admissible.

First, I argue that the resulting metaphysics of linguistic types is unacceptably heterogeneous. Mereological relations connect words and sentences, and there is no reason to think that these relations cross the concrete/abstract divide. Moreover, many sentences consist of a single word, and in these cases the Kaplanian concretist would be forced to say – quite implausibly – that the sentence type is abstract and structurally/functionally individuated, while the word type is concrete, in spite of the fact that the sentence tokens of the sentence type are also tokens of the word type.

Second, I will suggest that concretism can be extended to a uniform metaphysics of linguistic types, thereby avoiding the so-called productivity objection raised against concretism by Hawthorne & Lepore, once we withdraw the claim that linguistic types have a single origin and are individuated only by this origin. The identity conditions for linguistic types should countenance also the syntactical and morphological rules according to which types are originally produced. According to the resulting identity criterion for linguistic types, two tokens are tokens of the same type if and only if either they belong to a single history of repetitions and storages or if they belong to histories whose initial episodes consist in the application of the same morphological or syntactical rules to
Recently, the semantic status of slurs has been much and vividly discussed in analytic philosophy of language and linguistics. Obviously, the interest in this issue has been partly determined by the social and political significance of slurs in everyday life because the use of such expressions seems to involve the speaker’s adhesion to discriminatory practices towards minority groups. The primary interest in slurs has contributed to obscure other expressions whose semantics is similar to slurs’, which nonetheless are not slurs. This paper aims to clarify the semantics of such expressions in order to take apart two components which are usually confused, namely the derogatory dimension on the one side and the vulgar dimension on the other side. In particular, my proposal is to distinguish denigration and vulgarity. Derogatory expressions convey a negative judgement or attitude by the speaker towards somebody or something. Some of these expressions are also vulgar but not all of them are. Slurs are a particular sub-class of derogatory expressions, and, as any other derogatory expression, they can be vulgar or not. On the other hand, there are vulgar terms that are not derogatory words (and, thus, not slurs either). Vulgarity engenders expressivity and, therefore, when a vulgar derogatory expression is used, this intensifies the force of the insult directed towards a person. However, expressivity is only a consequence of vulgarity, not an independent dimension. Vulgar derogatory terms are expressive because they are vulgar (not the other way around).
Jan Hauska

Dispositions and Causal Conditions

Current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, designed in part with an eye to meeting the objections raised to its initial formulations, embrace a (potential) causal link between a disposition (usually in combination with its stimulus conditions) and its manifestation. The link has become the focus of the most recent criticism of the analysis: Daniel Nolan argued that the analysis founders upon dispositions whose conditions include ones which are not involved in bringing about the dispositions' manifestations. Nolan justifies his objection by pointing to various kinds of what he takes to be such noncausal dispositions. I respond to his criticism by giving reasons for being sceptical about what I take to be his two strongest examples. I first focus on dispositions whose conditions are said to include laws of nature. In particular, I discuss the supposed disposition of photons to travel at the speed of $3 \times 10^{10}$ m/s if the speed of light were $3 \times 10^{10}$ m/s. As the condition would plausibly be a law of physics, Nolan takes it to be noncausal, for 'the laws of nature about the speed of light do not cause light to travel around at one speed or another'. Then I tackle a case which rests on the observation that a material object can have a disposition to be contained within an empty space of a certain size whereas another one can lack it, being instead disposed to 'occupy extra space in addition'. Nolan regards the presence of the space as a noncausal condition of the dispositions since 'empty space does not seem to cause the larger [object] to overspill it, or cause the smaller object to occupy it with space to spare'.

Andrea Bottani

Nominalism, Properties and Things that can be said

According to van Inwagen’s theory of the property role, properties are ‘things that can be said of things’. Although this theory is, as its proponent says, ‘very nearly vacuous’, it has in his view an impressive list of substantive consequences about the nature of properties – in particular, it entails that properties are abstract and universal, and thus that nominalism is false. In this paper, I argue that 1) the very idea of a thing that can be said of things is less clear than van Inwagen seems to believe, since it can admit of two different interpretations; 2) in one of these interpretations, which is perfectly coherent and defensible even though it is not van Inwagen’s preferred one, the idea fails to entail that properties are universal, and it is far from clear that it entails that properties are abstract. Therefore, the idea that properties are things that can be said of things does not imply Platonism about properties.
Francesco Nappo  
*Analogies in Science*

This paper develops a novel account of the role of analogical reasoning in scientific inquiry. On this account, an analogy between two scientific domains can be understood as inductively significant if and only if one takes there to be non-negligible evidence that the two domains have analogous explanations (where identity is treated as a special case of analogy). This account might seem disappointing because it attempts to explain the inductive significance of an analogy in terms of the presence or absence of another analogy. However, I will argue the account is both non-circular and informative. I will conclude with some observations concerning the way in which my account can be couched in terms of the Bayesian theory of confirmation.

Jonathan Egeland Harouny  
*Epistemic Internalism and Testimonial Justification*

I present a novel argument providing intuitive support for internalism about the epistemology of testimony. The argument is analogous to Lehrer and Cohen's (1983) New Evil Demon Scenario, but instead of focusing on perceptual beliefs, it focuses on testimonial beliefs. It presents a scenario involving a pair of epistemic agents who share the same internal reasons, but who differ with respect to external conditions like reliability and truth. Moreover, the agents appear to be equally justified in believing the same propositions. And the best explanation for why this should be so is that the facts about testimonial justification supervene upon one's internal reasons, or so I will argue.

I also defend the argument against three objections offered by Wright (2016a; 2016b). According to the first objection, justification is the same as Plantinga-warrant, and since the agents in my argument differ with respect to Plantinga-warrant, they also differ with respect to justification. My response is that this objection begs the question against the internalist by assuming (without argument) that justification is an externalist condition – namely, that it is Plantinga-warrant.

According to the second objection, responding in the manner above by denying that justification is Plantinga-warrant devalues justification insofar as it detaches it from knowledge. My response is that the objection fails since (i) the internalist still can say that justification is closely attached to knowledge insofar as it is a necessary condition of it, and (ii) that justification can be valuable as a means to satisfying some other (epistemic) property.

According to the third objection, internalism about testimonial justification isn't able to account for our intuitions about certain cases involving circular testimony. My response is that the cases under consideration are underdescribed, and when the necessary details are in place they actually provide intuitive support for internalism.

Sebastiano Moruzzi and Luca Zanetti  
*Truth and Philosophy with Children*

We argue for two theses: first, the quest for truth is an inescapable aim of inquiry, and as such it is an inescapable aim of philosophical inquiry with children; second, the inescapability of the quest for truth poses some constraints on the theory of truth and knowledge that should be put at the background of the practice of philosophical inquiry with children.
Inquiry is the process of asking questions and answering them in the form of judgment. To ask a question is to aim at receiving a true answer, and to judge is to take the content judged as true. In this minimal sense, to inquire is to seek for the truth. The aim of truth is also dialectically inescapable because any judgment and doubt about inquiry and our capacity for truth and knowledge would be a move within inquiry. The inescapability of truth allows us to argue against those who take philosophical inquiry with children as not aimed at discovering the truth and to support those who contend that truth as the aim of belief is at the centre of philosophical inquiry with children.

Lipmanian Philosophy for Children (P4C) is defended and vindicated within a broadly pragmatist framework. Some have recently argued that only a pragmatist conception of truth (and knowledge) can make sense of P4C. We argue against this fairly widespread view. First, the intelligibility of the practice is compatible with several accounts of truth and knowledge. Second, some accounts of truth and knowledge are incompatible with the inescapability of truth. Third, some motivations for weakening the realist and objectivist features of truth and knowledge can be captured by endorsing a pluralist account of truth and knowledge. A pragmatist view of truth and knowledge is therefore not necessary in order to vindicate philosophical inquiry with children.

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Sarah Songhorian  
*Is Empathic Regulation a Moral Virtue?*

The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the concepts of “empathy” and “virtue”. To this aim, I will distinguish two possible forms their relationship may take: empathy can either be conceived a) as a virtue per se; or b) as an enabling condition for virtues to develop. Pre-theoretically, we are driven to consider (a) as correct, and yet a better understanding of the concept of “empathy” shows that that is not the case. Thus, I will argue against commonsensical and broad definitions of “empathy” and “virtue”. In fact, while such definitions make (a) seem trivially true, they do not provide necessary or sufficient conditions for something to be an instance of empathy or virtue, and they are unable to account for the well-known biases, limitations, and excesses empathy actually or potentially has. I will thus propose a more restricted definition of empathy that can account for empathy’s flaws but makes (a) false. Indeed, under this definition, empathy proves to be neither necessary nor sufficient for morality (and thus, a fortiori, it cannot be a virtue per se).

The rejection of (a), however, tells nothing about (b). I will, thus, argue in favor of the idea that the ability to regulate empathy can have the role of making some moral virtues possible in so far as it is a tool for avoiding empathy’s weaknesses. Therefore, neither empathy nor empathic regulation are per se virtues, and yet a suitable empathic regulation (unlike empathy per se) can be a useful enabling condition for developing certain moral virtues, given a certain typical endowment of empathic abilities. In the absence of such endowment, however, one cannot claim that such virtues cannot be reached otherwise – being empathic regulation neither necessary nor sufficient for those virtues to develop.

Andrea Lavazza  
*Human and the Risk of Inequality: Prohibition or Compensation?*

Non-invasive brain stimulation (NIBS) is used to modulate brain excitation and inhibition and to improve cognitive functioning. The effectiveness of the enhancement due to transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is still controversial, but the technique seems to have large potential for improvement and more specific applications. In particular, it has recently been used by athletes, both beginners and professionals. This paper analyses the ethical issues related to tDCS enhancement, which depend on its specific features: ease of use, immediate effect, non-detectability and great variability of effects. In general, the concerns about NIBS can be divided into two broad categories: concerns about the harm that may be experienced by those who use the enhancement technologies and concerns about the adverse social impact of the widespread use and societal embrace of technologies. But if tDCS were to become widespread, there could be some potential side effects, especially the rise of inequality in many selective-competitive contexts. I discuss two possible scenarios to counter this effect: that of prohibition and that of compensation, each supported by reasons and arguments that seem plausible and worthy of consideration. The first scenario implies to normatively limit the use of neurostimulation for non-clinical applications. The second scenario, envisages a situation where the individual’s choice to enhance themselves is respected whilst addressing the negative composition effects of such choice, especially as regards inequality in competitive contexts. In conclusion, I show why I think the scenario of compensation is the preferable one.
Hayden Wilkinson

Infinite Utility and Risk

How should we evaluate worlds containing infinite populations? This is a crucial question for ethical consequentialists—their judgements of acts are determined by evaluations of worlds, and several leading physical theories now predict that our world will inevitably contain an infinite population. It is also not an easy question to answer—after all, standard analysis cannot say that any infinite total value is greater than any other (of the same order of infinity). Another crucial question is: how should we evaluate options involving infinite worlds, when we are not certain of which world will be produced? After all, we live in a risky and uncertain world, and ethical theories which judge only in cases of certainty are of little use.

We have various answers to each question separately, but only one attempt has been made to answer both—Arntzenius describes a principle which, first, takes expected utilities over finite regions (e.g., groups of people) and only then performs an expansionist aggregation. In this paper, I demonstrate a substantive problem for Arntzenius’ approach. There exists a decision scenario in which Arntzenius’ method diverges sharply from the intuitively correct judgement—in which it recommends an option which, for every probabilistic state of the world, has less total value.

To avoid this conclusion, we must reject expected utilities taken locally. We need a cardinal value for the world as a whole or we necessarily face this problem. I describe a criterion which provides such a cardinal value, using a formal apparatus similar to Arntzenius and to Vallentyne and Kagan. I present both a weak and a strong form of this criterion. The weak form is necessary to preserve our basic intuitions in finite cases. The strong form is more complete but implies that evaluations are relative to the physical location of the agent.

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- September the 6\textsuperscript{th} - afternoon
AULA CS3

Symposium on Constitutivism and Action Theory

Invited Speakers

Luca Ferrero: The many faces of constitutivism  
Adrian Haddock: Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism, and the Concept of the Human  
Matthias Haase: Truth in Action

Luca Zanetti  
Constitutivism about Alethic Normativity

Constitutivist strategies might be fruitfully understood as proceeding through the following steps: first, they claim that some features are constitutive of rational agency; second, they claim that rational agency is suitably inescapable; third, they attempt to ground the authority of some norm on the constitutive features of rational agency. In this paper I defend a form of constitutivism about alethic normativity by showing how to proceed through each of these steps. First, I highlight three truth-related features which arguably capture the minimal sense in which rational agency constitutively aims at truth: (a) to judge is to present the content judged as true; b) to ask a question is to want to receive a true answer; c) judgments can be based on evidential grounds only, that is, on grounds that speak in favour of the truth of the contents judged. Second, I argue that rational agency is dialectically inescapable: it is the sole activity whose evaluation requires us to engage in rational agency itself. Third, I argue that we should endorse a modest (as opposed to an ambitious) transcendental strategy with respect to the normativity of truth. Even though a constitutivist view can show that we don't need a reason to be rational agent, it doesn't have the resources to show that we should care about the truth and to argue that our rational agency is not normatively arbitrary. However, I argue that even if rational agency turns out to be normatively arbitrary, this should not be taken as an objection to constitutivism. Rather, the constitutivist account allows us to properly locate the way in which truth is normative for us: it is the aim in the light of which any rational enterprise, be that theoretical or practical, is pursued.

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Jacqueline Taylor (keynote)  
Empathy and Indignation
Paul Thorn and Gerhard Schurz

Inheritance Inference from an Ecological Perspective

This paper presents results from a simulation-based study of inheritance inference. The study aims to ascertain which kinds of inheritance inferences are reliable, with attention to variations in reliability that are contingent upon the type of environment in which inferences are made. For example, the study addresses whether inheritance inference is reliable in the case of ‘exceptional subclasses’, and attends to variations in reliability that result from variations in the entropy level of the environment. A further goal of the study is to show that the reliability of inheritance inference depends crucially upon the criteria that are used in selecting the classes that serve as the basis for inheritance inference. One approach to inheritance inference proceeds by treating any atomic property as determining an admissible class. A second approach identifies classes with the cells of a partition (of size $k$) of the domain of objects that maximizes the similarity of objects that are assigned to the same class. In addition to permitting more inferences, our study shows that the second approach results in inferences that are far more reliable. The difference in the performance of the two approaches is particularly great in the case of exceptional subclasses.

Saúl Pérez-González

The Development of General Notions of Mechanism

Within the framework of the new mechanistic philosophy, several proposals have been raised. Despite the disagreements among those proposals, some general ideas are shared by all of them. In this paper, I introduce and discuss a general principle shared by new mechanists: the search for generality. New mechanists agree that a proper notion of mechanism has to be suitable for most of the fields of science where mechanisms are relevant. The development of general notions of mechanism is pursued with two different and alternative strategies, which I call the extrapolation strategy and the across-the-sciences strategy. The extrapolation strategy consists of developing a general notion of mechanism taking a few fields of science as reference. On the other hand, the across-the-sciences strategy consists of developing a general notion of mechanism that includes the features that all mechanisms share. After analysing paradigmatic examples of them, I argue that both strategies are unsuccessful. Finally, it is showed that the failure of the search for generality challenges a relevant argument in support of the mechanistic account of scientific explanation. Due to the fact that mechanisms are relevant in several fields of science, advocates of the mechanistic account of scientific explanation consider that it would be an all-encompassing and unifying account of explanation. Nevertheless, this argument relies in an assumption (i.e. the same notion of mechanism exits in all fields of science) that is challenged by the failure of the search for generality.

François Pellet

The Extinction of Life, or On the Nature of Disease

Contemporary theories of disease can be grouped under the labels “axiologism”, “dysfunctionalism” and “hybridism about disease”; these three groups of theories of disease rely, respectively, on the intuition that “$x$ is diseased” is a specific negative evaluative judgment viz. the attribution to $x$ of a certain lethal value; that for $x$ to be diseased is for $x$ to be biologically dysfunctional; or both.
Any complete theory of disease should obviously account for both of these intuitions. This talk provides a complete theory called “essentialism about disease”. After presenting these three groups of theories of disease, I argue for the following definition of disease: \( x \) is diseased iff (i) \( x \) is a healthy processual part of an organism, and (ii) \( x \) has a specific lethal value i.e. that \( x \) hosts properties destroying \( x \)’s essence.

For point (i), I argue for a fine-grained individuation of what can be diseased: only a healthy processual part of an organism (e.g. lung’s tissues, etc.) can be diseased. For point (ii), by following the WHO Constitution, health is a specific vital value, where for \( x \) to have a vital value is for \( x \) (i) to be (a processual part of) a good organism, and (ii) to possess all the properties essential for being (a processual part of) a good organism: e.g. if the lung’s tissues are getting more and more of their essential properties, then the lung’s tissues are being more and more healthy i.e. when all their specialized cells are grouped, where grouping these cells is the biological function of the lung’s tissues. If the lung’s tissues are not healthy, then they are diseased i.e. that they are losing more and more of their essential properties (e.g. through cells’ uncontrolled proliferation); the lung’s tissues are, thus, biologically dysfunctional.

Gabriele Ferretti and Marco Viola

*Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Roundtrip*

Since the dawn of cognitive science, there has been a rich and fruitful interplay between cognitive scientists and philosophers, as speculated by several thinkers (Bechtel 2009; Brook 2009; Dennett 2009).

However, only in recent times philosophers showed how they deeply recognize more and more the relevance of using empirical results from neuroscience to investigate philosophical problems. In the meantime, philosophical speculation has been also employed in investigating the epistemological foundations of the neuroscientific practice. In this respect, it seems that neuroscientific modeling and philosophical reasoning can massively interact. The former can offer empirical irons in the fire for the philosopher that embraces a naturalistic perspective when tackling genuine philosophical conundrums. The latter can provide conceptual tools that can regiment, from a logical and inferential point of view, the models proposed by neuroscientists as explanations of several cerebral phenomena.

In this paper, we want to sketch an account of how philosophical reasoning and neuroscientific modeling really interlock. To do so, we build on four case studies that exemplify this roundtrip. The first two cases show how experimental evidence drawn from neuroscientific models can help philosophical reasoning aimed at solving theoretical puzzles: this is the part of the trip that goes from neuroscience to philosophy (henceforth: NP) and is about the debate on picture perception and the one on Molyneux’s puzzle. The latter two suggest what is the contribution of philosophical reasoning to foundational problems related to neuroscientific modeling: this is the part of the trip that goes from philosophy to neuroscience (henceforth: PN) and is about the debate on the epistemology of neuroimaging and the one on the pluripotency of neural structures.

Michał Sikorski

*Values, Bias and Replicability*

The value-free ideal of science is a view which claims that scientists should not use non-epistemic values when they are justifying their hypotheses. I will defend the ideal by showing that if we accept the uses of non-epistemic values prohibited by it we are forced to accept as legitimate scientific conduct some of the disturbing phenomena in now a day science e.g. preference bias. I will use value-laden science from Douglas, 2009 and proposal concerning ontological choices from Ludwig, 2015 as examples of counterproposals to the ideal. I will also show how the use of non-
epistemic values contributes to the replication crisis and, following Betz, 2013, argue that value-free ideal is realizable.
Davide Dalla Rosa

*Was Kant an Intuitionist in Logic? Some Remarks in Light of Baroco and Bocardo in Kant’s Syllogistic*

Aim of this talk is to examine whether it is possible to consider Kant’s general logic as an intuitionistic logic. A positive answer to this question has been given by Achourioti and Van Lambalgen in two articles - (2011) and (2012)- in which Kant’s general logic is neared to geometric logic, a sub-type of intuitionistic logic. In order to assess this claim from a different point of view, I suggest to take into account specifically how negation, whose behavior is a fundamental parameter in the evaluation of the intuitionistic character of a logic, behaves in Kant’s theory of syllogism. I will focus myself on the problematic status of the two syllogistic moods Baroco and Bocardo, whose validity is shown in traditional logic by means of a reductio ad absurdum to a syllogism in Barbara. Since in intuitionistic systems of logic introduction of negation does not hold, this rule should not be listed among the inference rules of Kant’s general logic. By focusing on the unadjustable absence of reductio ad absurdum in Kant’s treatment of Baroco and Bocardo, it will be suggested how this absence could constitute a further possible evidence to the claim that Kant’s general logic is intuitionistic.

Robert Davies and Iva Apostolova

*Russell and Ryle: Monism, Memory, and Retrospection*

This is an exploratory project into Bertrand Russell and Gilbert Ryle’s philosophies of mind. It compares Russell’s views on introspection and memory with Ryle’s views on Retrospection. Russell was ‘suspicious’ of the status of introspection as a cognitive faculty and struggled with the status of the subject of cognition, knowable through introspection. This uncertainty culminated in Russell pronouncing the reduction of the subject to a mere logical fiction. With this, the function of the cognitive faculty of introspection becomes more obscured. In 1921 Russell announces the completion of the shift to neutral monism, which complicates further the status of the cognitive subject and the role of introspection. One thing that stands out in the transition is that Russell sees the role of memory as increasingly prominent. Following Russell’s development in the neutral monist period, we turn to Ryle who thought (1949) that most of the work of introspection could be done by the genuine capacity of Retrospection. He concluded that there was no difference in kind between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, but treatment of Retrospection leaves a number of unanswered questions. We examine a number which are crucial in deciding the extent to which retrospection can carry the load of introspection, and the extent to which Ryle was correct in concluding that there is parity between self- and other-knowledge. We conclude that a preoccupation with denouncing Cartesianism may have prevented Ryle from an alternative conclusion: that the supposed asymmetries between self-knowledge and knowledge of other minds do not need to be rejected, but instead can be explained by an appropriate view of memory, something to which, we think, Russell would have been sympathetic.

Maria Paola Sforza Fogliani

*Revising Logic: Antiexceptionalism and Circularity*

According to anti-exceptionalism (AE) about logic, logical laws do not have any epistemologically
or metaphysically privileged status; rather, logical theories should be justified, revised and compared just as scientific ones – that is, via an abductive methodology. I’ll first try to clarify the position, by reviewing which properties AEs think logic should be deprived of, by unpacking the abductive methodology, and by presenting the main implementations of the AE model – namely, Priest’s [2016] and Williamson’s [2017]. I will then advance some objections to AE, which stem from a well-know argument in the philosophy of logic – i.e., the Centrality Argument (CA). According to CA, logical laws are so central in rational reasonings that attempts to revise or to justify them end up using those laws themselves and, so, are illegitimate. I’ll build some versions of CA specifically targeted against the AE account, and show that the latter is at several levels threatened by circularities, both when evaluating theories with respect to given abductive criteria, and when performing the general computation. Hence, though AEs are right in claiming that logical theories have often been revised through an abductive methodology, their account faces some serious (broadly definable) metatheoretical objections. I will conclude by proposing a way of reconciling these two opposing cases, which resorts to Priest’s [2014] distinction between logica docens and logica ens – that is, between what logicians claim about logic, and what is actually valid. I’ll argue that AEs seem to submit only that logica docens is revisable, while remaining silent on logica ens’ fate; on the other hand, a minimal version of CA shows only that we can neither revise nor justify the laws of the correct logic – i.e., of logica ens – whatever this logic is. Hence, some compatibility can be worked out.

Constantin Brincus
Are the Open-Ended Rules for Negation Categorical?

Van McGee has recently argued that Belnap’s criteria constrain the formal rules of classical natural deduction to uniquely determine the semantic values of the logical connectives and quantifiers if the rules are taken to be open-ended, i.e., if they are truth-preserving within any mathematically possible extension of the original language. An assumption of his argument is that for any class of models there is a mathematically possible language in which there is a sentence true in just those models. This assumption, however, is problematic for the class of models of classical propositional logic. I argue that the existence of non-normal models for the classical propositional connectives, and in particular for negation, i.e., models for which the calculi remain sound and complete, but in which the logical constants have different meanings than the standard ones, undermines McGee’s argument.

Sebastiano Moruzzi and Filippo Ferrari
Alethic Pluralism, Deflationism, and the Integration Challenge

A core motivation for alethic pluralism—roughly, the thesis that propositions concerning different subject matters are true in different ways—is the explanatory inadequacy of deflationary conceptions of truth. Among the various ways in which truth can be explanatory, we focus on normative explanation— i.e. the issue whether truth is needed to account for the normative aspects of enquiry. Pluralists, contra deflationists, have argued at length that all admissible truth properties have a nature which importantly contributes to explaining the normative significance of an array of phenomena such as disagreement, and correctness. This is due to an influent argument put forward by Crispin Wright known as the Inflationary Argument. Elsewhere, we have argued that Wright’s argument is not globally successful. The domain of basic taste offers a counterexample. This suggests that the truth property operating in that domain is non-normative. Alethic pluralism must then be made more ecumenical and allow for a non-normative truth property among the local truth-realisers. The question at the core of this paper is then: how do we integrate a non-normative truth
property within an alethic pluralist framework? Call this the Integration Challenge. Two broad metaphysical models of alethic pluralism have been proposed: (i) Strong Pluralism maintains that there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which operates as the truth property for one or more domains, with no generic truth property applying to all domains; (ii) Moderate Pluralism maintains that in addition to the various domain-specific truth properties, there is a generic truth property operating across all discourses. We develop and assess two strategies for alethic pluralists to meet the integration challenge. We argue that the first strategy is highly problematic for all existing versions of alethic pluralism while the second is only available to strong pluralists.

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Carnap famously argued that there are two kinds of questions and claims concerning the existence or reality of entities: internal and external ones. We focus on Carnapian external ontological claims. While Carnap considered them as meaningless, we consider them as faultlessly meaningful. However, in line with an expressivist guise, we do not claim that they have the meaning they have in virtue of representing a certain range of entities in the world or describing pieces of reality. Quite the contrary, we maintain that they are meaningful because they perform a function that is fundamentally expressive and non-descriptive. In particular, they may imply a distinctive type of metalinguistic expressive function. Nevertheless, expressivism is commonly associated with mentalism. Does our expressivist approach then necessarily commit us to a mentalist or internalist account of the meaning of ontological claims? We will answer negatively for at least two reasons: i) Expressivism is best developed at the level of meta-semantics rather than at the level of (first-order) semantics. ii) It is possible to explain the meaning of external ontological claims in terms of the ‘practical’ commitments to the adoption of certain linguistic frameworks they express, rather than as expressing some kind of mental state (inside the head). Therefore, the commitment expressed by one who uses a statement of that sort is not understood, in the first instance, as an ontological commitment to the way reality is, but rather a practical commitment to the adoption of a certain linguistic framework, hence a commitment to think and reason in a particular way.

James Miller
A Bundle Theory of Words

Debates in the metaphysics of language have largely focused on two interrelated issues. First, whether words are particular objects composed of stages, or whether words are abstract types or kinds, either as Platonic kinds, immanent kinds, or artifactual kinds. And second, how to individuate words, with most debate being about whether to do so through the meaning of words or through their history/origin.
In these debates, it has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. Indeed, most of the literature, has proposed that we should posit not just particular substances, but types or kinds too. This means that, in the metaphysics of words, almost all theories posit at least a two category ontology of substances and properties, with many, if not the majority, in fact defending (at least) a three category ontology of particular substances, universal substances (or kinds or types), and properties.
In this paper I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts (semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical) of properties.
After evidencing the substance assumption that is prevalent within the metaphysics of words literature, I argue that a bundle theory can better account for certain phenomenon than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics, especially those within (distributed) morphology.

Michele Lubrano
Vague Existence and Criteria of Identity
Vagueness is a pervasive linguistic phenomenon. It is usually taken to pertain only to non-logical symbols. Yet there are pressures, coming from certain metaphysical debates, especially those about parthood and composition, to introduce vague quantifiers into our semantic toolbox. Sider (2003) raised a powerful objection against the very possibility of a satisfactory account of vague existence and vague quantification. If such an objection is effective, then we are left with two options, none of which is attractive: either giving an account of quantifier-vagueness that departs significantly from the standard semantic account of vagueness or accepting that quantifiers are not subject to vagueness.

What I hope to show in my presentation is that the above dilemma is a false one. An elegant and intuitively compelling theory of vague quantification, able to both dispense us with metaphysical deadlocks and faithful to the standard semantic conception of vagueness, is at hand, once we are willing to enrich a broadly quinean conception of existence with the reciprocally connected notions of sortal and criterion of identity. I will show that the resulting theory is both descriptively adequate and able to dispose of Sider’s objection.

Jamie Taylor
An Inconsistent Triad: Priority Pluralism, Perdurantism and Gunky Time

Priority Pluralism is the thesis that there is more than one fundamental entity; hence pluralists usually suppose the fundamental entities are mereological simples. Perdurantism is the thesis that objects are composed out of temporal parts for every interval of time they exist. And to hold that time is gunky is to hold that for every interval of time, t, that interval is composed out of some smaller sub-interval of time. All three of these positions are quite commonly held in metaphysics, but in this paper, I aim to demonstrate that all three positions are incompatible. One cannot be a pluralist, a perdurantist and accept that gunky time is metaphysically possible. This is because it can be demonstrated that perdurantism and gunky time entail mereological gunk: where some object is gunky iff every part of it has a proper part. Mereological gunk however is incompatible with pluralism however, as in a gunky world there would be no mereological simples to serve as the pluralist's fundamental entities. Given that pluralism is generally held to be a metaphysically necessary thesis, the mere possibility of mereological gunk renders it false. Accepting perdurantism and the possibility of gunky time entail mereological gunk is significant, as it shows that even if space is atomistic (i.e. is composed out of points or discrete chunks) and that objects have parts in each region of space they pervade, that does not rule out the possibility of mereological gunk. Consequently, I show that accepting all three theses' entails either accepting Priority Monism, endurantism or that time is necessarily atomistic.

Samuele Iaquinto and Giuliano Torrengo
Do Impossible Material Objects Exist?

We argue that Lewis’ concretism, mereological universalism, and what we call principle of material inheritance (according to which, if all the parts of an object x are material, then x is material) are jointly incompatible.

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Daniele Sgaravatti

_Dogmatism and Misleading Evidence_

Dogmatism about a cognitive source S is the thesis that if you form a belief P on the basis of S, although S is fallible, that belief is prima facie justified, independently of any other epistemic facts. I will argue that Dogmatists are committed to accepting some defective arguments. Here is an example

**RED WALL:**

I. It looks to me as if the wall is red  
II. The wall is red  
Therefore,  
III. The wall is not white but bathed in red light.

Dogmatists generally accept RED WALL as a good argument. But it appears that the argument is circular or somehow defective. A principle which could explain what is going wrong is formulated (and contested) by Vogel [2014]:

**Negative Entailment (NE)** If Y entails X, X is not [by itself] a justification to believe not-Y

Vogel offers some counterexamples to (his versions of) NE. I will argue that his counterexamples do not work. I will then turn to some more general considerations in support of NE. Suppose I believe not-Y on the basis of some X entailed by Y.

a) The belief that not-Y is not sensitive; I would have that belief even if it were false.
b) My evidence does not eliminate any possibility in which my belief is false. It does not contribute to its safety.
c) My evidence does not raise the probability of not-Y (in fact it might lower that probability).
d) We know in advance that the evidence will support the claim that it is not misleading, so we cannot use to rule out that possibility.

Taken together, these points show that in the situation described X does not advance the reliability (points a) and b)) or the rationality (points c) and d)) of a belief in not-Y.

Sebastiano Moruzzi

_The Alethic Leaching Problem for Hinge Epistemology_

I argue that Annalisa Coliva's hinge epistemology faces a problem related to the truth-aptness of hinges. In a recent paper Coliva has defended the view that hinges possess a deflationary truth property while ordinary empirical propositions have a more substantial truth property such as the property of corresponding with the facts. This position amounts to a form of alethic pluralism. Alethic pluralism is standardly understood along two models: moderate pluralism (propositions of
different domains can be true in different ways though they all share a generic truth property) and strong pluralism (propositions of different domains can be true in different ways and there is no shared generic truth property). I argue that hinges cannot be modeled using the moderate pluralist model because it involves the postulation of a brute fact with respect to their truth status. Nor hinges can be modeled using the strong pluralist model because this is incompatible with the entailment relations between hinges and ordinary propositions. I conclude that Coliva's hinge epistemology cannot be stabilized using alethic pluralism.

Matteo Zicchetti

*Truth, Trustworthiness and Reflection*

What should theories of truth be like? Hannes Leitgeb answered this question in What Theories of Truth Should be Like (but Cannot be), by providing desiderata that truth-theories should satisfy. His analysis shows that theories can only consistently satisfy proper subsets of the desiderata. Any choice of truth-theory must therefore be accompanied by an argument for privileging the desiderata that it satisfies over those it does not. The aim of this paper is to propose an additional requirement for truth-theories to provide a way out of this dilemma.

I will introduce the notions of acceptance of and reliance on a theory, and argue that these epistemic attitudes imply an implicit commitment to the theory. I will spell out the new requirement as trustworthiness; in a trustworthy theory S it should be possible to consistently make our reasoning patterns about and implicit commitment to S explicit. It is known that a way of achieving this is to add a reflection principle for S (short RefS) to S. More formally I will say that:

(T) A theory S is trustworthy iff S is consistent (or sound) once RefS is added to S (and the procedure is iterated).

There are different non-equivalent formulations of RefS. In the second part of the paper I will spell out a notion of acceptance, which – as I will argue – can only be made explicit (in first-order logic) with the use of the truth predicate, which implies a specific formulation of RefS, the global reflection principle.

The addition of (T) to the desiderata identified by Leitgeb (2007) changes the panorama of theories of truth by providing a way of isolating a class of privileged theories. In concluding, I will evaluate the consequences of this proposal for the current debate on formal theories of truth.

Carlo Proietti

*Polarization explained with Argumentation Graphs*

Discussion among individuals often induces polarization and bipolarization effects, i.e. individuals radicalize their initial opinion (about a debated issue) towards the same or opposite directions. Social psychologists have put forward Persuasive Arguments Theory (PAT) as a clue for explaining polarization. PAT claims that adding novel and persuasive arguments pro or contra the debated issue is a major cause of polarization. Recent developments in abstract argumentation provide the tools for capturing these intuitions on a formal basis. Here, Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (BAF) are employed as an instrument for encoding the information of agents in a debate relative to a given issue a. Different measures are available to express the degree of acceptability of the opinions pro or contra a in a BAF (before and after debate). It is shown that these measures - being used as an indicator of polarization - provide the basis to capture the intuitions of PAT and illustrate how polarization and bipolarization arise in simple two-agent scenarios. Clustering of different groups and policies of "strategic" information transmission and update are sufficient conditions for these dynamics to unfold. Most importantly, strategic information policies are not necessarily
irrational. Indeed, in many cases individuals devote more scrutiny to hypotheses and explanations that speak against their prior beliefs, as witnessed also by the history of scientific debates (Kelly 2008). Often, agents are more likely to find arguments, if any, to confirm or reinstate their priors. Analysis with BAF allows to capture such dynamics and to show that bipolarization may arise even in conditions of full and open communication. I conclude by presenting some results and open questions that can be answered by the BAF approach.

Adriano Angelucci

On Giving Arguments for Cases

A traditional epistemological practice (P) appeals to a case which is taken to count as a counterexample to a theory in virtue of a certain claim C holding true of it. According to the Standard View (SV), C is typically supported by an intuition. According to the Argument View (AV), C is typically supported by an argument. AV holds that being able to provide or being in possession of a good explanation of why C is the case is what ultimately makes us justified in believing C. The talk intends to challenge this assumption.

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Marco Viola  
_Cognitive Functions and Neural Structures: Population-Bounded Mappings_

Neuroimaging studies seek to map cognitive functions and neural structures. This mapping is unlikely to result in one-to-one correspondences, because brain structures seem inherently pluripotent (i.e. involved in multiple cognitive functions), and cognitive functions sometimes exhibit degeneracy (i.e. they might be implemented in distinct neural substrates). To face these issues, some scholars have argued for abandoning one-to-one mappings in favor of probabilistic many-to-many mappings.

However, even though probabilistic mapping is the best you can get when only two variables are considered (namely, function and structure), adding further variables might help to disentangle the “probabilistic smoothie” into discrete mappings, so to improve systematicity. The idea to “buy” further systematicity “at the expense” of a further variable is precisely the strategy that underlies the so-called contextualist approaches to brain mapping. In my talk I will argue in favor of such strategy, and I will introduce a novel class of contextual variable: namely, the ontogeny of individual brains.

Ontogeny shapes the functional role of neural structures, leading to relevant variance among individuals. These have been often neglected, since neuroscientists often worked under the assumption to be dealing with a "normal brain". While this assumption has been useful, it also constraints neuroscience to investigate but a subset of elementary and universal cognitive abilities and to a subset of populations of subjects.

In this talk I will wonder whether it is possible to establish regular function-structure mappings in "abnormal" populations and/or concerning "abnormal" skills. Aided by some examples, I will provide a positive answer to this question, and I will speculate on the possibilities and the challenges of a "abnormal" neuroscience.

Alberto Barbieri  
_Is State Consciousness first? Creature and State Consciousness in Light of the For-meness of Experience_

It is widely acknowledged that there is an important distinction between consciousness attributed to creatures, or subjects, and consciousness attributed to mental states (Manson, 2000). The first use of the concept has been called ‘creature consciousness’, and the second use ‘state consciousness’. These two ‘consciousness properties’ are supposed to identify two distinct explananda. They are, however, undoubtedly interconnected, and any theory of consciousness must state which of these properties is its primary explanandum. Actually, the vast majority of philosophers of mind claims that creature consciousness depends, or is derivative, on state consciousness. I call this view the Priority of State Consciousness thesis (PSC). Philosophers who, more or less explicitly, endorse some version of PSC are, among others, Block (1995), Drestke (2005), Gennaro (2012), Kriegel (2009), Levine (2001), Rosenthal (1986), Williford (2015), Zahavi (2005).

The aim of this paper is to put pressure on the truth of PSC. I use the discussions about the for-meness (or subjective character) of the experience to argue against this thesis. More precisely, I argue that if you take for-me-ness as essential for phenomenal consciousness and you want to justify it on phenomenological grounds, persevering PSC is problematic. In fact, such thesis forces us to characterize the for-me-ness of experience in a way which is not supported by phenomenology.
- September the 7th -
morning
Alberto Voltolini (keynote)
*We might not have met Zeus, yet we could have landed on Vulcan. Against Mythical Transcreationism*

There is a grain of truth in Goodman’s (2014) aversion to *mythical creationism*, the thesis that mythical entities – kinds of fictional entities that typically are not recognized as such by their purported authors, for they entertain no relevant act of make-believe – are created items *qua* abstract artefacts. Yet not only this grain has not to do with the problem of ascribing to such entities inadvertent (i.e., nonintentional) creation, as Goodman himself has later (2017) acknowledged, since this form of creation (Zvolenszky 2016) may properly affect both fictional and standard mythical entities, legendary entities, but also, it regards only those entities for which Kripke himself (2013) said that they are mythical just in a metaphorical sense: empirical posits. For, unlike both properly fictional and legendary entities, an empirical posit is an artefact created only later by an audience; that is, once what the both numerically and metaphysically different entity the merely purported author originally thinks of, i.e., a concrete entity that is merely possible, is no longer attended to by that audience. Thus, the true anticreationist response to mythical creationism consists just in being against mythical transcreationism, the doctrine according to which those who actually did not author mythical entities such as empirical posits, their merely purported authors, are nevertheless their creators.

Valentina Martinis
*Cognitive Phenomenology and The Sceptical Paradox*

This paper aims to propose a viable solution to Saul Kripke’s Sceptical Paradox (Kripke 1982) in the light of the theses of Cognitive Phenomenology and Phenomenal Intentionality. In particular, I will maintain that a Phenomenal Intentionality Theory of Thought (PITT for short, see of course Pitt 2011: 142) may offer a «straight» solution to Kripke’s Paradox, i.e. a solution which establishes what the Sceptic denies, that is that «there can be no fact as to what I mean by ‘plus’, or any other word at any time» (Kripke 1982: 21).

Nevia Dolcini and Veronica Valle
*Partial Hallucinations: on the Mismatch between Perception-likeness and Indistinguishability*

The possibility of hallucination represents the main challenge to the traditional view of perception as the most direct state of awareness of the external world. Thus, the philosophical discussion about hallucination is widely modelled after fundamental epistemological concerns, whereas in empirical disciplines it is explicitly directed towards the understanding of causes and treatments. Notwithstanding the different goals and research methodologies, recent trends in philosophy favour the usage of empirical data in the assessment of accounts of hallucination (and perception); in line with such a trend, our discussion will combine the traditional terms and questions from the philosophical debate with relevant empirical data from clinical psychology. More specifically, we will focus on the notion of indistinguishability, which seems to be grounding the widely accepted philosophical definition of hallucination. Yet, outside of philosophy, ‘actual hallucinations’ are typically regarded as experiential states possessing (degrees of) sense of reality, rather than indistinguishability. While the requirement for perception-likeness is weaker than the requirement
for indistinguishability, both seem to stem from and depend on the perception-likeness of hallucinatory experiences, in the intuitive sense that only perception-like experiences might possess a high degree or reality, and/or might be indistinguishable from veridical perception. In contrast to it, by discussing two cases of actual hallucinations, namely the hallucinations from the Charles Bonnet Syndrome, and auditory verbal hallucinations reported in cases of schizophrenia, we will show that, at least in these specific cases, the subjects’ capacity for distinguishing between a veridical perception and a hallucination is independent from the (reported) apparent phenomenal qualities of the experience. Thus, we will suggest, the precise relation that indistinguishability and sense of reality bear to perception-likeness need to be further investigated.

Giorgio Mazzullo

*Are Earworms Hallucinations? A New Proposal about the Nature of Hallucinations*

Some philosophers (Allen 2015; Nanay 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Pagondiotis 2013) have argued that we should dismiss the traditional conception of hallucinations in favour of the claim that hallucination is mental imagery that is involuntary and accompanied by a presentational character. However, it is controversial whether mental imagery can actually satisfy these two conditions. In a recent series of papers, Nanay (Nanay 2015, 2016a, 2016b) has argued convincingly that the phenomenon of earworms prove that mental imagery can be involuntary. Earworms are tunes that pop into our heads and that we keep on having auditory imagery of, even though we do not want to. So, it seems that mental imagery can satisfy the first condition. As for the second condition, things get more difficult. Earworms, for instance, are, arguably, not accompanied by the presentational character. Hence, according to Nanay's account of hallucinations, they are not hallucinatory episodes. In this paper, I aim to show that, correctly understood, earworms are hallucinations. In particular, I will argue that we should reject the claim that mental imagery can be accompanied by the presentational character. To this end, I will argue against Nanay’s claim (Nanay 2016b) that lucid dreams are paradigmatic examples of mental imagery accompanied by the presentational character. The idea is that even if we maintain that mental imagery constitutively lacks the presentational character, nonetheless we can still hold that at least one kind of hallucination is a form of mental imagery. Indeed, we can presume that hallucinations could belong to different mental kinds (Macpherson 2013). According to this approach, hallucinations which belong to the perceptual experience kind are involuntary and accompanied by the presentational character, but hallucinations which belong to the mental imagery kind are not accompanied by the presentational character. Hence, involuntary episodes of mental imagery, like earworms, are hallucinations.

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Sean Costello

The Glorified Body: A Fourfold Worry for the Traditional Doctrine and a Temporal, Animalist Solution

The belief in the bodily resurrection of the dead is a central tenet of traditional Christianity. However, I believe that this doctrine – as normally understood – faces numerous difficulties and is in need of reinterpretation. In this paper, then, I advance my argument as follows. First, I lay out the historical, exegetical, and traditional Christian claims concerning bodily resurrection, which involves affirming that the doctrinal belief is not just in the resurrection of a body, but the resurrection of the same body (despite now having several new properties due to its ‘glorification’). Next, I briefly discuss the traditional (Thomistic and Scriptural) view of heaven, specifically its historically affirmed atemporality, the state of the beatific vision, and the absence of generation and corruption. I then present four arguments which seem to tell against the possibility of (i) the glorified body really being a body, and (ii) this glorified-embodied thing being the right sort of thing to be me’. These arguments concern: (1) incorruptibility; (2) continuity of care; (3) time, space, and matter; and (4) humanity being an ‘historical being’ essentially engaged in a narrative. I next suggest that, even if we remove one of the traditionally held beliefs (i.e. the sameness of the body in resurrection, the body in resurrection, or the atemporality of heaven), we still seem to have arrived at an impasse, and this central doctrine of Christianity seems to be in jeopardy. I conclude by suggesting that an amended position, which both denies the atemporality of heaven, and posits a simulacrum-solution to bodily continuity in the tradition of van Inwagen, with an age regressing or progressing purgatorial option, is perhaps the best way to preserve the spirit of the traditional doctrine of the resurrection of the body while avoiding its difficulties.

Lorenzo Azzano

Dispositionalism as Hyperintensional Metaphysics

Dispositionalism and Categoricalism are two opposing views about the nature of properties: for the first, but not the second, each property is essentially associated to certain causal powers, which it bestows upon its bearer. As usually formulated, Categoricalism also has a modal component, according to which properties have causal powers associated to them contingently; thus it is common to formulate the distinction between the two views as a modal distinction about the behavior of properties across the modal space. However, Categoricalism can survive the loss of its distinctive modal component; something more is then needed from the dispositionalist to make her position stand out. This additional content can be provided in two ways: with the help of either essence or grounding locutions, which unavoidably involve more-than-modal hyperintensional linguistic resources. However, this bears far-reaching consequences for the dispositionalist, which is supposedly a metaphysical realist, in the sense that she takes her position about the nature of properties (and thus, her opposition to Categoricalism) as an objective and mind-independent matter. For the legitimacy of the debate now rests on the assumption that reality is finer-grained than modality.

Jani Hakkarainen

Categorial Fundamentality and Non-Fundamentality
At the moment, there is a lively debate on fundamentality in metaphysics and metametaphysics, as is documented by the topic of Fundamentality in PhilPapers(https://philpapers.org/browse/fundamentality). In this discussion, one can spot a considerable gap: ontological categories do not play practically any role in it. This is so even though metaphysics arguably studies categories such as objects, properties, sets and events, which suggests that at least one type of metaphysical fundamentality is categorial fundamentality. I fill in this gap by proposing an account of categorial fundamentality and non-fundamentality. My proposal elaborates on the late E.J. Lowe by F. Correia and A. Skiles’ concept of generic identity. Fundamental categories are those categories whose membership is fully determined by a simple formal ontological relation (“FOR”) or relations jointly in an order. Simple FORs are fundamental because their holding is not constituted by, in the sense of being generically identical with, any different FORs. The members of fundamental categories stand in the same simple FOR or FORs in the same order and their membership in a fundamental category is nothing more. To illustrate with Lowe’s realism, substance, modes, kinds and attributes are fundamental categories in his four-category ontology. The membership of any of them is fully determined jointly by the simple FORs of instantiation and characterization in an order. Any mode, for instance, characterizes a substance and instantiates an attribute.

By contrast, the membership of non-fundamental categories is not fully determined by a simple FOR or FORs jointly in an order. Categorial non-fundamentality is having membership at least partly determined by a non-simple FOR in an order. In Lowe’s four-category ontology, for example, events are non-fundamental because their membership is not fully determined by the simple FORs of instantiation and characterization. Events are changes in the modes of substances.

Tuomas Tahko (keynote)
Special Science Laws and Higher-Level Kinds

What is the ontological status of special science laws and higher-level kinds? Are the special sciences autonomous in virtue of featuring genuine laws and natural kinds? Jerry Fodor once wrote that if we disagree about what is a natural kind, then, for the same reason, we will probably also disagree about what is a (genuine) law. For the ontological anti-reductionist, it’s important to demonstrate that at least some special science laws and higher-level kinds are “really there” – that they are something over and above the lower-level kinds that they depend on. A traditional argument suggests that the multiple realizability of higher-level kinds does just this: if there is one higher-level kind that can be realized by several lower-level kinds, then a straightforward reduction does not seem possible, except perhaps to a “wildly disjunctive” set of lower-level kinds. But this argument needs to be supported by a theory of realization that does not already assume the existence of genuine special science laws or higher-level kinds.

Most of us are familiar with this debate from the classic papers by Jerry Fodor (1974, 1997) and Jaegwon Kim (e.g., 1992), where Fodor represents the ontological anti-reductionist (or non-reductionist) and Kim represents the reductionist approach. Much of the debate has taken place in the context of philosophy of mind and hence psychological kinds, but most of the proponents of anti-reductionism believe that the lesson generalises: there are genuine higher-level kinds also in, e.g., biology and chemistry, over and above the (fundamental) level of physics (cf. Tahko forthcoming). Indeed, Kim uses the famous case of jade, which he claims to be analogous to the case of psychological kinds: ‘we are told that jade, as it turns out, is not a mineral kind, contrary to what was once believed; rather, jade is comprised of two distinct minerals with dissimilar molecular structures, jadeite and nephrite’ (1992: 11). So, jade looks to be multiply realizable. But Kim, favouring reductionism, thinks that the special science laws concerning jade are genuine laws, despite having the basic form of a law and being able to support counterfactuals. This is because such laws are not projectible – they do not have ‘the ability to be confirmed by observation of positive instances’ (ibid.). Fodor challenged this result and denied that the case of jade is analogous
to the case of psychological kinds. However, this raises questions about the role of multiple realizability in the anti-reductionist argument. I will analyse the case of jade and suggest that there is still some mileage in this classic debate between Kim and Fodor.


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Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways

In her ground-breaking book Epistemic Injustice, Miranda Fricker characterizes testimonial injustice (TI) as a kind of epistemic injustice: as a systematic and persistent credibility deficit caused by identity prejudices that damages the capacity of the victim as a knower. Someone may object that, while it is obvious that there is injustice involved, it is unclear that the injustice is of an epistemic kind. Consider the case of a woman whose testimony regarding a rape case is not given credibility or whose knowledge of football is dismissed with a “come on, women cannot even understand the offside rule”. It can be argued that, despite not being believed, she retains her knowledge: she knows who raped her or her offside, whether other people believe her or not. We believe that shifting from the epistemological framework favoured by Fricker to a metaepistemological take on knowledge makes the above examples peripheral to the discussion: even if they don’t involve epistemic injustice, the general phenomenon of TI retains its epistemic character. Furthermore, we believe that our ‘attributional’ approach to knowledge has an additional advantage: while Fricker’s starting point is a situation of structural socio-economic injustice (the epistemic injustice is directed towards members of oppressed and powerless groups in virtue of their membership to such groups) which facilitates TI, her diagnosis of the latter kind of injustice is more psychological than structural: prejudices and other forms of biases are central to her understanding of the injustice and to most of the ensuing discussion. We’d like to suggest that changing our focus from psychological factors to unjust public norms makes more salient cases of persistent injustice where the harm is epistemological indeed.

Epistemic Accountability and Attributionism

This paper argues that interpreting epistemic deontology in terms of attributionism about responsibility allows us to make sense of epistemic accountability without having to accept doxastic voluntarism.

Epistemic deontology is the view that epistemic practices are subject to deontological concepts such as blame, responsibility, or ought. A famous criticism against epistemic deontology is to point out that deontological concepts apply only when we have direct voluntary control, and beliefs are not under direct voluntary control. Supporters of epistemic deontology have pursued two different strategies in answering the critique. First is to endorse doxastic voluntarism. This has been criticized for misconstruing the role that will and choice play in belief-formation, and many find the second strategy more convincing. That is to deny that ought implies can in epistemic context. The main insight within the No-Ought-Implies-Can strategy (NOIC) is that in epistemic context ‘ought’ refers to standards of evaluation. This doesn’t solve the problem, however, because it's uncontroversial that standards of evaluation don't presuppose voluntary control. Therefore both critics and defenders of epistemic deontology can concede that NOIC is right, while arguing that it still doesn't earn the right to use other deontological concepts such as duty, blame, or responsibility. They can continue to hold their positions with respect to these concepts, and the possibility of voluntary control.

I suggest a novel solution to the problem, which is to adopt a competing account of responsibility. Attributionist views of moral responsibility deny that voluntary control is necessary for responsibility, and claim that we hold others accountable also for those acts that somehow reflect on
the agent. When applied to epistemic accountability, attributionism succeeds in accommodating the conflicting intuitions: it earns the right to use deontological concepts without having to accept doxastic voluntarism, while not being limited to standards of evaluation.

Christian List, Franz Dietrich and Paul Egge
Supervaluationism About Vagueness: a Judgment-Aggregation Perspective

Supervaluationism about vagueness in natural language is based on the idea that some predicates have multiple rival interpretations or specifications. A sentence is deemed determinately true if and only if it is true according to all specifications; and determinately false if and only if it is false according to all specifications. In all other cases, the sentence is assigned no determinate truth value. Supervaluationism, however, is only one way of “aggregating” the verdicts of different specifications. In this paper, we introduce insights from the theory of judgment aggregation to study a broad spectrum of different aggregation functions. This allows us to offer an axiomatic characterization of supervaluationism, which, in turn, locates it precisely within a larger logical space of possible approaches to vagueness.

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Janek Guerrini

An Attempt to Account for Privative Adjectives through an Intensional Semantics

In formal semantics of natural language, the subsective interpretation works for most adjectives: from “x is an excellent lawyer” you can infer “x is a lawyer”. Not so for “fake” and other so-called non-subsective adjectives (alleged, putative). You can however say “that gun is a fake gun” and in fact it is often noted that a fake gun is not a gun, but also not a mere non-gun. Hence, “fake” must be a modifier that changes some properties of the head and leaves others unaffected. I propose that every noun is a structured set of properties divided into the set of essential (E) and the set prototypical (P) properties. “fake” changes some of the essential properties (context-sensitive) and leaves unchanged P: f(E, P):= ( {is built with the intention/ has the intention of fooling x into thinking that e and cannot e: e \in E} , P-E)

I then show how this account is generalizable to other non-subsective adjectives: “alleged” and others similarly modify only some essential properties. I also show how this accounts for sentences like “that lion is a stone lion” when the modifier clashes (leads to contradictions) with some properties of the head, these are lost by the head and the extension gets broadened in function of how many properties were clashed out. That is why you can still say a stone lion is a lion. I finally compare my account with the two other principal stories about privative adjectives, and show in particular that:

1) My account provides an underlying and more fine-grained structure that explains why Partee’s general principles of Head Primacy and Non-Vacuity work. Moreover, unlike in Partee’s account, in mine the Head-Primacy is never violated.
2) My intensional account has some advantages compared to Del Pinal’s similar but extensional one.

Laura Caponetto

The Pragmatic Structure of (Sexual) Refusals

The notion of ‘illocutionary silencing’ has been given a key role in defining the harms of pornography by several feminist philosophers. Though the literature on silencing focuses almost exclusively on the speech act of sexual refusal, oddly enough, it lacks a thorough analysis of that very act. My main aim is to fill this theoretical gap and disentangle the pragmatic structure of refusals. I claim that refusals are ‘second-turn illocutions’: they cannot be accomplished in absence of a previous interrogative (or open) call by the hearer. Furthermore, I maintain that refusals constitute authoritative illocutions only when preceded by requests for permission. This has significant implications for (at least) a very common reading of the silencing argument against pornography, according to which pornography may prevent women from refusing sex by undermining their (practical) authority (cf., among others, McGowan 2009; Sbisà 2009). I shall discuss such implications in the concluding section of the talk.

Francesco Gallina and Alessio Santelli

Assertions in the of Forking Paths

Branching concretism is the metaphysical view according to which our universe is a bunch of tree-
like arranged possible worlds, which overlap towards the past and branch only towards the future. Branching concretists, moreover, claim that each possible world in our universe is metaphysically on a par with the others, so that none of them can be said to be the unique, actual world. Branching concretists are naturally confronted with the so-called assertion problem involving future contingents: how can we make sense of assertions about future events that are not settled at the time of the assertion? The paper explores two main candidate solutions to the assertion problem – namely, Belnap’s wait-and-see strategy and MacFarlane’s normative approach – and shows that none of them is satisfactory. This negative result, in turn, suggests that the branching concretist view leads to a radical revision of the ordinary linguistic practice of assertion.

Luca Zanetti

'Just Is’ isn’t Just ‘Is’

Augustin Rayo (2013, 2015) Trivialism is the view that mathematical statements have trivial truth-conditions. Central to Rayo's project are what he calls `just is'-statements, for example `for the number of the dinosaurs to be Zero just is for there to be no dinosaurs'; Rayo forcefully claims that such `just is'-statements cannot be read as statements of metaphysical grounding (p. 5). In this paper I formulate a notion of grounding for the Trivialist.

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Saba Bazargan-Forward  
*The Identity-Enactment Account of Familial Duties*

Associative duties are agent-centered duties to give defeasible moral priority to our special ties. Our strongest associative duties are to close friends and family. According to reductionists, our associative duties are just special duties – i.e., duties arising from what we have done to others, or what others have done to us. These include duties to a) abide by promises, b) compensate our benefactors, and c) aid those whom we have made vulnerable. All such special duties require that we give extra weight to the welfare of those to whom the duties are owed. By identifying associative duties with special duties, reductionists make sense of the extra weight we are required to give family by identifying it with the extra weight special duties afford. I argue, though, that reductionism faces a difficulty: associative duties to family are far stronger than special duties, which suggests that we cannot identify all associative duties with special duties. After explicating this challenge, I present an alternative reductionist analysis of associative duties – the ‘Identity-Enactment Account’. This account not only accommodates the peculiar strength of our familial associative duties, but also characterizes them in an intuitively compelling way. On this account, our strongest associative duties are special duties to protect or promote the welfare of the duty’s beneficiary by adopting and enacting a practical identity in which the duty’s beneficiary features prominently. The idea is that there are persons who can legitimately demand a prominent place in our mental lives, for the protection and intimacy it affords. They can, in effect, legitimately demand to be among our nearest and dearest. The correlative of such a demand is, on our part, an associative duty we have toward them.

Vitor Sommavilla de Sousa Barros  
*Value Constitutivism*

In this paper, I argue in favour of a version of metaethical constructivism according to which an agent’s reasons for action are constituted by what follows from her standpoint as a valuing agent (Street 2008; 2010; 2012). This view promises to solve two kinds of problems constitutivist constructivists face: the schmagency problem (Enoch 2006) and the problem of the arbitrariness of the constructivist procedure (Enoch 2009; predecessors in Shafer-Landau 2003 and Hussein and Shah 2006). I argue that Street’s theory on its own cannot fully deal with these objections, unless two modifications are made to her theory. First, the standpoint cannot be given a merely formal characterization. Second, and more importantly, constitutivism cannot be applied to the activity of valuing, rather it must be applied to values (normative judgments) as such. Therefore, roughly, what an agent has normative reason to do is what follows constitutively from her values, not her valuing. This might seem like a small modification, but it has the consequence that the constructivist procedure (however it is conceived) has to be understood as an epistemic, rather than a constructive, procedure.

Johanna Privitera  
*Ex Ante or Ex Post Contractualism? In Defense of a Partially Aggregative View*

A recent debate in the ethics of risk focuses on whether, within a broadly contractualist framework, the claims of persons on whom a risk of harm is imposed should be modeled ex ante or ex post.
While proponents of ex ante views, such as Johann Frick, hold that the permissibility of risky actions depends on the prospects the risky action has for each individual affected, proponents of ex post views, for example Marc Fleurbaey and Alex Voorhoeve, hold that it depends on the overall distribution of outcomes we expect the action to generate. In my talk I will discuss two strategies to settle this dispute: First, it could be argued that in cases in which we are certain about the overall distribution of an action’s outcomes and are only ignorant about which individual(s) will be harmed, we ought to adopt an ex post approach, while in cases in which we can only infer statistically that a certain overall distribution of outcomes is very likely, we ought to adopt an ex ante approach. This strategy, however, has counterintuitive implications in certain cases of inversely correlated risks. Second, it could be argued that the otherwise impermissible interpersonal aggregation of ex ante claims is permissible in the case of inversely correlated risks. The argument for this view draws both intuitive plausibility and on certain features of the separateness of persons objection. While not incorporating an ex post approach itself, this partially aggregative ex ante view preserves much of the appeal of ex ante views while yielding the same verdicts as ex post views in those cases that seemed to lend the ex post view most of it’s intuitive support.

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Implicit attitudes are mental states that sometimes cause subjects to respond in ways that seem to suggest that they believe that \( p \) despite the fact that the subjects sincerely assert that \( \neg p \), assent to sentences that mean that \( \neg p \), and ascribe the belief that \( \neg p \) to themselves (Bayne and Hattiangadi 2013, Levy 2015). According to standard accounts, the states have associative content (Fazio 2007, Gawronski and Bodenhausen 2011, Gendler 2008a, 2008b). Recently, however, theorists have argued convincingly that no such account can explain the phenomena that it is supposed to explain, and suggested instead that the states have propositional content (Mandelbaum 2013, Levy 2015).

It is far from evident how we should otherwise characterise implicit attitudes. Neil Levy has recently suggested that implicit attitudes are patchy endorsements (Levy 2015). These states are supposed to be different from beliefs and imaginings, and from all other mental states that we are already familiar with. They are also supposed to explain a wide range of puzzling phenomena, including what I call the sweater responses. Here are some examples of such responses: people have a stronger desire to own a sweater if they believe that their favourite celebrity has made contact with the sweater than if they believe that the celebrity has not made contact with it, people experience more pleasure when they believe that they are in contact with a sweater if they believe that the celebrity has made contact with it than if they believe that the celebrity has not made contact with it, and people have a stronger desire to own a sweater if they believe that their favourite celebrity has made contact with it than if they believe that the celebrity has made contact with the sweater, but that it was sterilized thoroughly afterwards (Newman, G, Diesendruck, G, Bloom, P. 2011).

Should we explain the sweater responses in terms of patchy endorsements? In this talk, I argue that we should not. I start off by suggesting that we should appeal to patchy endorsements in our explanations only if the kind patchy endorsement can provide deeper causal explanations of the responses than other mental state kinds (cf. Woodward 2016, Bayne and Hattiangadi 2013). I draw on the tools provided by interventionism (Hitchcock and Woodward 2003; Woodward 2003, Woodward 2016), and suggest that the kind can provide deeper such explanations if the notion of patchy endorsement allows us to answer more what-if-things-would-have-been-different-questions about the responses than other mental state notions. I then outline the imagination account and the patchy endorsement account of the responses. I do this by describing the functional role of what I call unconscious imaginings (cf. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Currie and Ichino 2012, Sullivan-Bissett forthcoming), and the functional role of what Levy calls patchy endorsements, and by showing how the states are supposed to explain the responses. Finally, I show that the notion of unconscious imagination allows us to answer more what-if-things-would-have-been-different-questions about the responses than the notion of patchy endorsement, and conclude that we should not explain the sweater responses in terms of patchy endorsements.

Fazio, R. H. (2007), “Attitudes as Object-evaluation Associations of Varying Strenght”, Social
Contrary to the widespread attention given to emotions, moods are still a quite under-theorised kind of mental states: many theorists of affective states relegate moods in few paragraphs at the margin of their discussion of emotions (Solomon 1994, Griffiths 1997). Yet moods are very interesting for a number of reasons. One such reason is the fact that people who report on their moods say that they feel in a certain way, and yet they also say that they feel that way about nothing in particular. If one takes these reports at face value, moods are a counterexample to intentionalism (Tye 2000, Crane 1998), according to which the phenomenal character of any phenomenal state must be captured in terms of mental contents.

I argue that we can accommodate moods in a intentionalist perspective by rejecting the assumption that moods have a phenomenal character. Following Lormand 1985 and Sizer 2000, I argue that moods are functional states with no content.

I show that the phenomenal-less theory of moods has distinctive advantages over its competitors: it meets all the criteria commonly assumed to identify moods (Lormand 1985), it keeps the distinction in kind between moods and emotions and it saves intentionalism all at once. Finally, I provide an explanation as to why people misreport that moods are phenomenal states.

Emiliano Loria

Emotions are not Pedagogically Transmitted. Theoretical Inconsistency between Natural Pedagogy and Social Biofeedback Theories

Halfway between innatism and constructivism, the Social Biofeedback (SB) theory, proposed by György Gergely and John Watson (1996), constitutes an interesting model of emotional Self-consciousness. Gergely, Unoka, Futó (and also some philosophers) hypothesise a close cooperation between Natural Pedagogy model (NP) and SB model. The former is a transmission of cultural knowledge model based on ostensive communication between adults and infants; the latter takes into account the infant’s internalisation process of contingent “marked” emotions-mirroring displays. The social biofeedback model assumes that human infants initially show a primary bias «to construct representations mainly based on exteroceptive stimulation [and] leads to the
construction of discrete emotions» (Di Francesco et al. 2016, p. 119). In this view, discrete emotions emerge from raw precursors, i.e., the basic emotions delineated by Ekman (1992). The affective parental mirroring manifestations should involve the onset of infant’s second-order representations about primary non-conscious affective Self-states. Such basic affective states are initially perceived by infants either positively or negatively. For this reason, I suggest that SB might abandon Ekman’s basic emotion theory and coherently assume the perspective, or anyway some crucial aspects, of the constructivist theory of emotions proposed by Russell (2003), who introduced the notions of “minimal universality” and “core affects”. Instead, the second-order representations should become cognitively accessible and allow the progressive conquest of subject’s introspective awareness able to discern anger, for example, from an indistinct negative arousal.”.

Gergely et al.’s theoretical proposal about NP and SB’s cooperation is based on the equivalence between marked affect-mirroring displays and infant-directed cues of ostensive communication intended as referential knowledge manifestations, where „knowledge” stands for the variety of emotions. The grounding elements of NP system (i.e., the comprehension of ostensive communication) would make possible also the social construction of the infant’s inner emotional Self. Such claim entails that inner emotions, like cultural knowledge, are taught by adults to infants through social interactions based on the referential-expectation power of ostensive communication. I reject any cooperation between NP and SP for the construction of the child’s inner emotional Self, and I will show the theoretical incompatibility between the two models. Nevertheless, I am not going to deny that infants learn to regulate and express their own emotions via continuous social interactions with the attachment figures. However, I deem that this kind of pragmatic learning does not pass through an explicit pedagogical teaching. Furthermore, I suggest that a better explanatory link between the interpretation of parental „markedness” and the understanding of pretence in infancy has to be provided.

I intend to underline SB’s debt to Mead (1934) theory of emotions as communicative and social act (Caruana&Viola 2018). Then, I will show that the presence of ostensive cues is not fully sufficient to establish the necessary conditions for NP model. Even if we assume that the „markedness” of emotion displays constitutes a pragmatic form of ostensive communication, the automatic involvement of pedagogical stance is not granted or implied by sharing the referential nature of ostensive cues. In fact, pedagogical stance requires a high degree of intentionality: the intention of teaching. Such manifested intention is not so evident during parental affect mirroring that consists, instead, in a dialogical negotiation (Griffiths&Scarantino 2009) which is not established in the name of a declared teaching intention. Finally, I conclude that social biofeedback and natural pedagogy are not dependent on (or hierarchically connected to) each other. On the contrary, they are autonomous cognitive systems which share (and are based on) infants’ great sensitivity to interpret the referential nature of ostensive communication.


Futó J. (2010), The role of marked forms of caregiver-infant interactions in children’s conceptual development and the formation of their representational abilities, PhD Doctoral thesis, Debreceni Egyetem [University of Debrecen], BTK.


This paper aims at contributing to a socio-constructivist theory of the development of a minimal self, starting from Gergely&Watson’s Social Biofeedback Model (SBM). According to SBM, through repetitive episodes of protoconversation characterized by marked affective “mirroring”, children develop a distinctive phenomenology of basic emotions. Their initial experience is limited to raw sensations having a valence dimension: an elemental, binary, dimension of the agent’s attitudes toward reality. This view is coherent with emotional Constructivism, which looks at emotions as conceptual processes starting from core affect, i.e., primary appraisal of the world enabling to discriminate something as (e.g.) helpful or harmful. While useful, reference to constructivism leaves important points unanswered. Notably, it is unclear which role, if any, the body plays in the construction of emotional introspection. To tackle this point I suggest to supplement the analysis with the conceptual grid coming from different perspectives: Stern’s Vitality Forms (VF) and Damasio’s Background Feelings (BF). VF are the multimodal, dynamic structure whose perception scaffolds emotional discrimination. Particularly in interpersonal contexts, VF deliver information strictly akin to valence. Therefore, provided that valence structures core affect, we can conclude that, although not explicitly taking part to the the debate on constructivism, Stern defends a position which is perfectly coherent with
it. Moreover, by referring to Damasio’s BF, Stern emphasizes the role of the body in the construction of psychological introspection: selfing processes are now supplemented with a stronger accent on the corporeal dimension. Together, Stern and Damasio supplement the constructivist approach sustaining SBM, stressing the role of interpersonal interactions (Stern) and bodily dimension (Damasio). In the conclusion, I will compare my proposal with other “anti-Cartesian” recent approaches, notably with Carruthers’s hypothesis of the phylogenetic priority of hetero-directed knowledge.

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Joan Gimeno-Simó

Pronouns, variables, compositionality, and monsters

Recent discussions on the nature of assertoric content have put forward a seemingly problematic claim about Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives (henceforth LD): namely, that variable binders are monsters, since they shift assignment functions, and assignment functions are parameters used for generating content, just like contexts are. Thus, allowing variable binders would prevent sentences from being compositional at the level of Kaplanian content. I will be arguing that these claims, while important, are harmless for compositionality when we are dealing with natural language: free variables, at the level of logical form, are always restricted by their φ-features, but these are deleted when they are bound. Therefore free and bound variables may be, after all, distinct lexical items, which means that the logical form of a sentence containing a free pronoun can never be found embedded if that pronoun is bound. This means that compositionality can still be vindicated at the level of Kaplanian content.

Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum

Translating trueways

Dorit Bar-On challenged Quine’s explanation of what translators think about. Quine had suggested that there were several equally well-founded options to translate a foreign word (e.g. ‘gavagai’ might stand for ‘rabbit’, ‘rabbit part’ or ‘rabbit stage’). Bar-On replied that often translators are faced with the opposite predicament, of not having a single adequate translation at their disposal. I argue that both accounts miss the point of what translators do. Where Quine described the meaning of the source-language words as indeterminate, Bar-On raises an analogous sceptical concern about target-language words. In actual fact, however, translators who know both languages have neither of these worries. Their concern is with congruency of meaning between expressions in the two languages. Knowing the scope of each their meanings, their skill consists in finding a target-language expression whose meaning overlaps all important aspects of that of the source-language expression.

Explaining this has become much easier with a tool introduced recently by Stephen Yablo, ‘trueways’. In Aboutness(2014), he explicates the meaning of assertions as the set of sets of worlds exactly alike with how they make the assertion true or false. Each such set, a ‘trueway’/‘falseway’, models one way the sentence can be true/false. I use this tool to explain how translators choose target-language expressions whose meaning overlaps all important aspects of that of the source-language expression.

This helps to show that determinacy is simply the wrong criterion to apply to translation. Instead, the translator’s job – and art – is to cover the right set of trueways and falseways.

Bianca Cepollaro, Claudia Bianchi and Simone Sulpizio

That’s What he said: an Empirical Investigation on Reporting Slurs

In this paper we present three studies on how slurs (pejoratives targeting people on the basis of
nationality, ethnicity, gender, etc.) and non-slurring insults (pejoratives that do not target social
groups) work in three environments: (i) in isolation (Pilot study), (ii) in direct speech (Study 1) and
(iii) in indirect reports (Study 2). Despite the theoretical work on slurs, there is no or little empirical
literature that investigates this topic. Our work aims to fill such a gap.

i. The Pilot study showed that slurs are perceived as more offensive than non-slurring insults when
presented in isolation. This is in line with what is usually hold in the theoretical literature.

ii. In Study 1, we found some surprising results: when they occur in atomic predications of the form
‘X is a P’, slurs are perceived as less offensive than when they occur in isolation, while insults are
perceived as more offensive than when they occur in isolation.
In order to explain these two findings, we have developed an information-based hypothesis that
crucially illuminates the distinction between slurs and non-slurring insults in terms of the
information they carry and the function that they fulfil. Such a perspective is more compatible with
hybrid views (e.g. presuppositional) rather than with expressivist theories.

iii. Moreover, Study 2 showed that indirect report of the form ‘Z: Y said that X is a P’ decreases
(without deleting) the offensiveness of utterances featuring slurs and insults.

Such results speak against prohibitionist theories on slurs, which predict that the offensiveness of
slurs is not sealed when slurs are reported, and poses challenges to the non-prohibitionist accounts,
which acknowledge that sometimes the responsibility is ascribed to the reported speaker, but have
to explain why reported slurs obtained a decreased rate of offensiveness.

Noah van Dongen, Felipe Romero, Matteo Colombo and Jan Sprenger
Meta-analysis of Semantic Intuition Research

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, experimental philosophy started to contribute to the
debate on theories of reference through Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich’s seminal article
"Semantics, cross-cultural style" (2004). Their empirical results indicated a difference in semantic
intuitions between Western and East Asian people. However, this study failed to replicate during in
a high-powered and preregister replication study that was part of the X-Phi Replication Project. On
the other hand, some previous studies on cross-cultural differences in semantic intuitions do provide
support for Machery et al’s (2004) original result. Existing literature, then, raises the questions: To
what extent is the original result robust? To what extent does existing evidence support the
hypothesis that East Asians are more likely than Westerners to have descriptivist judgments about
the reference of proper names?
In this talk, we present results of meta-analyses of the body of research on semantic intuitions to
obtain a better understanding of the robustness of Machery et al’s (2004) finding in particular and of
cross-cultural differences in semantic intuitions in general.

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